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THE CHANGING GUARD OF PATENT LAW: CHEVRON
DEFERENCE FOR THE PTO

MELISSA F. WASSERMAN*
Whereas Congress has increasingly turned to administrative
agencies to regulate complex technical areas, the patent system has
remarkably remained an outlier. In the patent arena, the judiciary—
not a federal agency—is perceived to be the most important expositor
of substantive patent law standards. Yet, as the criticism toward the
patent system has grown, so too have the challenges to this unusual
power dynamic. The calls for institutional reform culminated in late
2011 with the enactment of the historic Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act (AIA). Although scholars have recognized that the AIA
bestows a glut of new powers upon the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), this Article contends that commentators
have failed to recognize the extent to which the AIA alters the fundamental power dynamic between the judiciary and the PTO. By
anointing the PTO as the primary interpreter of the core patentability
standards, this Article posits that the AIA rejects over two hundred
years of court dominance in patent policy.
Although the patent system has traditionally suffered from a lack
of serious engagement with administrative law, applying administrative law principles to the AIA has tremendous implications for the
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roles of patent institutions and, as this Article argues, results in a
normatively desirable outcome. The AIA, by making the PTO the primary expositor of the core provisions of the Patent Act, ushers the
patent system into the modern administrative era—which has long
recognized the deficiencies associated with judge-driven policy.
Moreover, the incorporation of administrative law principles into the
patent system has substantial implications for administrative law
itself. As this Article attempts to reconcile the distinctive features of
patent administration with existing administrative law jurisprudence, it provides insight into a prolonged circuit split on the proper
approach to determining the triggering provisions for formal adjudication, as well as when a grant of formal adjudicatory authority
carries with it the ability to speak with the force of law.
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INTRODUCTION
The modern administrative state is built on the premise that
administrative bodies, as a result of their focus, manpower, and proficiency, will reach more effective decisions than their counterparts
in the judiciary or legislature.1 Thus, it is hardly surprising that
Congress has increasingly chosen to delegate broad law-making
authority to administrative agencies.2 Today, administrative institutions assume primary interpretative authority over federal statutes
that regulate fields ranging from the environment, to pharmaceutical drugs, to telecommunications. Yet, the patent system has
remarkably remained an outlier, even though it shares the same
technocratic attributes as legal arenas that are overwhelmingly
dominated by agency policy making.
Although the Patent Act defines the patentability standards in
broad and vague language, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO or Agency) lacks robust substantive rulemaking authority3 and receives no judicial deference for its legal
interpretations of the Patent Act.4 As a result, the United States
1. See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 6-46 (Greenwood Press
1974) (1938); Louis L. Jaffe, In Memoriam, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78
HARV. L. REV. 319, 320-21, 327-28 (1964).
2. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[I]n our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); see also
Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (“In many profound ways, the innumerable activities of everyday
life—working, traveling, transacting, recreating, indeed eating, drinking, and breathing—are
affected by the work of federal administrative agencies.”).
3. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the PTO
lacks the ability to promulgate rules on the core patentability standards that carry the force
of law).
4. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text. Although the PTO has begun to exert
more influence in the development of patent law and policy, the lack of judicial deference paid
to the Agency’s legal interpretations of the Patent Act sets it squarely apart from agencies
that exercise wide discretion and are afforded strong judicial deference when regulating
technological innovation, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal
Communications Commission. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence
in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1966-67 (2009) (“[T]he PTO has maneuvered since the
early 1990s to occupy a more central position in making patent law and policy.”); see also
Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive
Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 387-400 (2011) (arguing that the PTO plays a more
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), which is
vested with near-exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, is
largely perceived to be “the most important expositor of the substantive law of patents in the United States.”5
Yet, as criticism toward the patent system has grown, so too have
the challenges to this unusual power dynamic.6 An increasing number of commentators believe this lopsided institutional structure is
the root cause of the patent system’s systemic failures.7 An even
larger contingency of scholars support reforms that would shift
greater power to the PTO.8 The cries for institutional reform
prominent role in substantive patent law than is traditionally acknowledged).
5. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1757 (2011); see
also Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2053 (2007) (“[T]he Federal
Circuit is unquestionably the most influential player in the U.S. patent system.”).
6. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 1-28 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A.
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 1-6 (2009).
7. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 1041, 1075 (2011) (noting that courts have struggled with patentable subject matter
inquiries and that the state of jurisprudence could be improved by granting the PTO rulemaking authority over patentable subject matter); Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure,
and the Divided Patent Power, ADMIN. L. REV., Winter 2011, at 31 (arguing that the courts
should take a more deferential approach in determining whether a rule is substantive or
procedural, the result of which would leave the PTO with ample discretion to manage the
prosecution process); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) (“The ostensibly discrete
problems of our patent institutions stem from an initial mistake in institutional design.”);
Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831,
839-40 (2012) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s overly narrow view of the PTO’s rule-making
powers “has impeded innovation and the express goal of Article I of the U.S. Constitution to
promote ‘the Progress of Science and useful Arts’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8));
Wasserman, supra note 4, at 420-29 (arguing that the structural relationship between the
PTO and the Federal Circuit has inflated the boundaries of patentability).
8. Scholars have suggested reforms ranging from granting the PTO unlimited substantive rule-making authority, see Burstein, supra note 5, at 1751 (proposing that Congress
should grant the PTO substantive rule-making authority so that the Agency would be able
to pronounce legal rules on the core patentability standards that carry the force of law);
Golden, supra note 7, at 1041 (“[T]he enterprise of regulating patentable subject matter
should be primarily entrusted to the USPTO, rather than, as it is now, to the courts.”), to
greater control over its own procedures, see Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP.
CT. REV. 275, 279 (arguing that Congress should reorient patent law’s institutional
arrangements by granting the PTO substantive rule-making authority); Arti K. Rai, Growing
Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for Managerial Control,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2056 (2009) (arguing that the PTO should have greater control over
its procedural functions); Tran, supra note 7, at 839-41 (arguing that courts should read the
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culminated in 2011 when Congress enacted the historic LeahySmith America Invents Act (AIA).9 The AIA provided the first major
overhaul to the patent system in sixty years and undeniably increased the stature of the PTO by granting the Agency a host of new
responsibilities, such as fee-setting authority10 and the ability to
conduct new adjudicatory proceedings in which patent rights may
be obtained or challenged.11
This Article contends, however, that commentators have generally failed to recognize the extent to which the AIA alters the
fundamental power dynamic between the Federal Circuit and the
PTO. Although scholars acknowledge that the AIA bestows a glut of
new powers upon the Agency,12 they have nearly uniformly concluded that “Congress stopped short of allowing the PTO to interpret the core provisions of the Patent Act—those that affect the
scope of what is patentable.”13 Though Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai
PTO’s rule-making authority more expansively), to an increased role in determining patent
validity, see, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 791 (2008) (noting that one reform to the
patent system about which most scholars agree is the enactment of a robust postgrant review
proceeding).
9. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). This Act has been described as “the most
significant overhaul to our patent system, since the founding fathers first conceived of
codifying a grand bargain between society and invention.” David Kappos, Re-Inventing the US
Patent System, DIRECTOR’S F.: A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Sept. 16, 2011, 5:45 PM),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/re_inventing_the_us_patent.
10. AIA § 10, 125 Stat. at 316-20 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41) (fee-setting authority).
11. Id. § 6, 125 Stat. at 299-313 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319, 321-329)
(postgrant review proceedings); id. § 12, 125 Stat. at 325-327 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257)
(supplemental examination); id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321)
(transitional program for covered business-method patents).
12. See, e.g., Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 610, 626-40 (2012)
(delineating the new powers the AIA affords the PTO).
13. Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 238 (2013); see, e.g., Tran,
supra note 12, at 643-44 (noting that while the AIA grants the PTO some additional rulemaking authority, this new authority does not include the ability to make rules over core
patentability requirements such as patentable subject matter, novelty, and obviousness);
Mark A. Lemley, Things You Should Care About in the New Patent Statute (Stanford Pub.
Law Working Paper No. 1,929,044, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1929044 (delineating the twenty most significant changes in the AIA but not
mentioning a shift in interpretative authority to the PTO).
Moreover, even though there is a growing body of literature analyzing the postgrant review
system—which this Article contends is the source of the PTO’s new interpretative
authority—the vast majority of the scholarship has failed to recognize the potential for a shift
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have observed that certain congressional bestowals of adjudicatory
authority may entitle the PTO’s legal interpretations of the Patent
Act to strong judicial deference,14 this Article provides the first indepth exploration of whether the actual powers granted by the AIA
would result in the PTO becoming the primary interpreter of the
core patentability requirements. This Article concludes that the AIA
rejects over two hundred years of court dominance in patent policy
by anointing the PTO as the chief expositor of substantive patent
law standards.
In general, the patent system has historically suffered from a lack
of serious engagement with administrative law,15 even though
Supreme Court intervention in 1999 made clear that standard
administrative law norms—including the Administrative Procedure
in the power dynamics of the patent system. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant
Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
103, 103-06, 134-35 (2011); Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the
U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 98990, 1014-15 (2004); Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-7, 117-22
(1997); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivan S. Kuo, Post-Grant Review of Patents: Enhancing the
Quality of the Fuel of Interest, 43 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 83, 83-87, 109-10 (2002).
14. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 327-28 (2007) (“The various
postgrant review proceedings that have been proposed would be trial-type procedures on the
record that bear the hallmarks of formal adjudication—most notably, a proceeding before an
administrative judge at which the parties present evidence and cross-examination, with the
judge’s decision based on the record. Such proceedings would have sufficient formality to
satisfy Mead’s test for application of Chevron deference. Thus, if Congress created these
procedures and said nothing more, Chevron deference would seem to apply to them.”
(footnotes omitted)); Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1280 (2012) (“In fact, the executive
branch could also use the postgrant-review authority conferred upon the PTO by the AIA to
go one step further. As a doctrinal matter, under current Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the contexts in which Chevron applies, the government could ask for Chevron
deference toward decisions made in postgrant review proceedings.”).
However, neither of these articles analyzed the language of the AIA, applied or
acknowledged the three-way circuit split on when formal adjudications are triggered, or
performed any analysis of when a grant of formal adjudicatory authority carries the ability
to speak with the force of law.
15. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 14, at 270 (“In contrast to commentators and
practitioners in other technically complex areas ... the patent law community has tended to
pay little attention to administrative law.”); Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the
Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2009) (“Throughout the
twentieth century, administrative law and intellectual property law seemed as if they were
hermetically sealed off from each other in both theory and practice.”).
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Act—apply to the PTO.16 Applying administrative law principles to
the AIA provides that the PTO’s legal interpretations of the Patent
Act, as announced by its new adjudicatory proceedings, are entitled
to the highly deferential standard of review articulated in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.17 As this
Article argues, this deference is a normatively desirable outcome.18
Making the PTO the primary interpreter of the core patentability
standards ushers the patent system into the modern administrative
era, which has long recognized the deficiencies associated with
judge-driven policy.19 This provides the institutional foundation for
infusing economic policy into the patent system, enabling the tailoring of patentability standards to advance the system’s constitutionally mandated goal: the promotion of innovation.
Additionally, the incorporation of administrative law principles
into the patent system has substantial implications for administrative law. As this Article attempts to reconcile the distinctive features of patent administration with existing administrative law
jurisprudence, it tests, and at times, brings into better focus, the
contours of this doctrine. This exercise in reconciliation offers insight into a prolonged circuit split on the proper approach to
determining the triggering provisions of formal adjudication and
when a grant of formal adjudicatory authority carries the ability to
speak with the force of law. Even though an agency’s eligibility for
Chevron deference turns on whether its actions carry the force of
law, in the adjudicatory context the force-of-law concept has been
largely undertheorized.20
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief summary
of the Supreme Court’s strong judicial deference doctrine and then
chronicles why the PTO’s patentability determinations have never
been afforded Chevron deference. Part I concludes by introducing
16. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
application of pre-APA standards to its review of PTO fact-finding).
17. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
18. See infra Part III.
19. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2079 (1990) (“For the twentieth century reformers, courts lacked the flexibility, powers of
coordination, initiative, democratic accountability, and expertise necessary to deal with
complex social problems.”).
20. See infra Part II.B.
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the Agency’s new adjudicatory proceedings—specifically postgrant
review and inter partes review.21 Part II analyzes how existing
administrative law jurisprudence applies to these new proceedings
and, from a doctrinal standpoint, concludes that the Federal Circuit
should give Chevron deference to reasonable PTO validity determinations announced during postgrant or inter partes review. This
conclusion rests on only two principles: first, that Congress intended
the PTO’s new adjudicatory powers to be effectuated through formal
adjudication, and second, this grant of formal adjudicatory authority
was accompanied with the ability to speak with the force of law.22 In
making this latter argument, Part II begins by developing a conceptual framework to determine when a grant of formal adjudicatory
authority would be sufficient to infer a delegation of interpretative
authority, and then it turns to addressing conceivable counterarguments. Finally, this Part also provides insight into a twenty-five
year circuit split on determining the triggering provision of formal
procedures by furnishing a strong theoretical basis for rejecting the
dominant approach.
Part III makes the normative justification for Chevron deference.
This Part maintains that the PTO has a comparative institutional
advantage over the Federal Circuit and also argues that the Federal
Circuit does not emerge as a clear winner with respect to the
comparative risk of interest group influence. Consequently, Part III
concludes that this shift in the power dynamics between the PTO
and the Federal Circuit is normatively desirable.
I. CHEVRON AND THE HISTORICAL LACK OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
THE PTO
The PTO is a federal agency housed in the Department of
Commerce, which fulfills its mission of fostering innovation and
competition primarily through examining patent applications and
determining which inventions warrant the grant of a patent.23 The
21. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299-313 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 311-319, 321-329) (postgrant review proceedings).
22. Under United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001), only formal
adjudication and rule making are very good indicators that Congress intended to allow the
agency to speak with the force of law.
23. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT,
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Federal Circuit, which is vested with near-exclusive jurisdiction
over patent appeals, reviews the Agency’s validity decisions.24
However, unlike most agencies, the PTO’s legal interpretations of
its enabling act—the Patent Act—are afforded no deference, much
less strong judicial deference. This Section begins by summarizing
the Supreme Court’s strong judicial deference doctrine and then
turns to chronicling why the PTO’s patentability determinations
have never been afforded Chevron deference. This Section concludes
by introducing the Agency’s new adjudicatory powers.
A. Strong Judicial Deference and the Supreme Court
Although the major developments of the strong deference doctrine
in administrative law have been told many times before, this
account highlights two themes of the Supreme Court’s deference
jurisprudence: first, the Court’s emphasis that strong deference to
an agency’s statutory interpretations turns on an inquiry into
congressional intent, and second, the Court’s growing recognition
that Congress can implicitly signal such intent.
Since the early decades of modern administrative law, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that strong judicial deference to an
agency’s legal interpretations is mandated when Congress intends
an agency to speak with the force of law. Thus, when Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency “to define a statutory term
or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision,”25 the
Court’s jurisprudence has long called for substantial judicial
deference.26
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Court substantially expanded the sphere of mandatory judicial
deference when it announced that courts must defer to an agency’s
FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 8-9, available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/
2009annualreport.pdf. However, the Agency also serves as an advisor to the President and
other agencies concerning intellectual property policy and provides training and capacitybuilding programs designed to foster respect for intellectual property among the trading
partners of the United States. Id. at 22.
24. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
25. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting Rowan Cos. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)).
26. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 253.
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reasonable interpretations when Congress expressly, as well as
implicitly, delegates interpretive authority.27 The Chevron decision
made clear that when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a
statute that an agency is charged with administering, it satisfies the
latter concern.28 The Court’s formulation of this mandatory deference is known as the famous two-step Chevron test. Under step one,
the court asks whether the statute, when interpreted clearly and
unambiguously, resolves the issue.29 If the statute is unclear, the
court proceeds to step two, under which it must defer to an agency’s
interpretation that is “based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”30
Chevron’s seemingly simple two-part formulation, however, generated considerable confusion in lower courts.31 Perhaps the largest
source of disagreement is what has become known as the matter of
“step zero”: When should the Chevron framework apply?32 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp. provided much
needed guidance when it offered a two-part test of its own for determining when an agency’s interpretation is eligible for Chevron
deference: whether Congress delegated interpretative authority,
or the ability to speak with the “force of law,” to the agency in
question; and if so, whether the agency has “exercise[d] ... that
authority.”33 The Mead Court further clarified that a congressional
delegation of formal adjudicatory or rule-making power is generally
sufficient to infer—more specifically, “a very good indicator” of—
congressional intent to delegate interpretative authority to an
agency.34 The Mead decision left open the possibility that a grant of
less formal mechanisms of agency action may, at times, also satisfy

27. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 842.
30. Id. at 843.
31. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113, 203-07 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 835 (2001).
32. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 208 (2006) (noting
that the major source of disagreement among the Justices involves whether Chevron is
applicable at all).
33. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
34. Id. at 229-31.
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the force-of-law requirement.35 However, ensuing Supreme Court
opinions have failed to provide substantial guidance on what types
of informal procedures are sufficient to infer such a delegation.36
Although subsequent case law refined the Court’s strong judicialdeference doctrine, the basic architecture has remained intact. The
key inquiry as to whether an agency’s legal interpretation is
afforded Chevron deference continues to be one of congressional
intent: Did Congress mean for the agency to speak with the force of
law? Furthermore, ensuing Supreme Court cases have not disturbed
the principle that a grant of formal adjudicatory or rule-making
power is generally sufficient to satisfy the force-of-law requirement.37

35. Id. at 231. The Mead opinion also clarified that when Chevron deference does not
govern, a lesser deference standard articulated in the 1944 case Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944), applies. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35. As a conceptual matter, the
differences between the approach taken by Skidmore and Chevron deferences are substantial.
Skidmore stated that the level of deference owed to an agency’s legal interpretation should
be evaluated upon “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness.” Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted) (paraphrasing the factors enunciated in Skidmore).
By contrast, courts applying Chevron defer to “a reasonable interpretation” of an ambiguous
statute by the agency, regardless of its consistency with previous or subsequent statements.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. As this Article argues that the PTO’s new adjudicatory powers must
be effectuated through formal adjudication—one of the “safe harbors” of Mead—it will focus
only upon whether these proceedings garner Chevron deference, not the lesser Skidmore
deference. See infra Part II.
36. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445-46 (2005) (“[C]ourts [have] adopt[ed] inconsistent
approaches to the issue of Chevron deference when an agency does not use notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”).
37. See id. at 1457-58 & n.101; see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 14, at 297 (“[T]he PTO
generally engages in neither of the proceedings—informal rulemaking or formal
adjudication—that the Mead Court indicated would clearly merit deference.”); Sapna Kumar,
Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1569 (2011) (“Under Mead, if an
agency engages in formal adjudication, the Chevron framework is applicable.”); Thomas W.
Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 470 (2002) (“[L]egislative rulemaking [and] formal
adjudication ... unquestionably have the force of law.”); Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 360 (2003) (“[U]nder Mead, agency action by means of
rulemaking or formal adjudication will (almost) always receive deference.”).
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B. The Historical Lack of Deference Paid to the PTO’s Legal
Decisions
Like many other organic statutes, the Patent Act does not always
speak to the precise issue at hand—that is, determining whether an
invention merits an award of a patent often requires substantial
interpretive discretion.38 For example, take the doctrine of utility,
which precludes patents on inventions that have no use.39 The
courts and the PTO have developed three distinct doctrines of utility
—credible, specific, and substantial utility—and an invention must
meet all three in order to be eligible for patenting.40 Nevertheless,
the utility doctrine is derived from a single word in the Patent Act:
“useful.”41 Even though not every PTO validity determination may
involve the interpretation of a pure legal standard, it will, at a minimum, involve the application of a legal standard to a factual finding.
Because the highly deferential standard announced in Chevron
applies both to pure questions of legal interpretation and to the
interpretation involved in applying legal standards to facts,42 every
PTO validity determination could theoretically warrant strong
judicial deference.
The Federal Circuit has yet to afford the PTO’s validity determinations any deference, much less the highly deferential standard
announced in Chevron. To help understand why, it is fruitful to
undergo a brief exposition of the two primary activities of agencies
—rule making and adjudication—along with the levels of formality
with which each can be effectuated. The Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), which governs the way most agencies partake in rule
38. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV.
51, 53 (2010).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
40. See, e.g., Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098-99 (Jan. 5, 2001)
(delineating that credible, specific, and substantial utility must be met in order for an
invention to be patentable). At one time, courts also required moral utility. See Juicy Whip,
Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (eviscerating the moral utility
doctrine).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
42. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 14, at 297 (“Under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,
Chevron applies both to pure questions of legal interpretation and to the interpretation
involved in applying legal standards to factual findings.”).
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making and adjudication, defines a rule as “an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”43 Rule making is
defined as the “process for formulating, amending, or repealing a
rule.”44 By contrast, adjudications are defined as matters other than
rule making.45 Thus, any agency decision that involves a final decision other than rule making, such as the decision to grant or deny
a patent, constitutes an agency adjudication.46
The APA sets up a “feast-or-famine” archetype for adjudicatory
procedures.47 Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA set forth an
array of trial-type protections that govern formal adjudications.48
These protections are generally equivalent to the safeguards available in a civil judicial trial. They include, for example, entitling
parties to oral arguments,49 conducting cross-examination of witnesses,50 and making exceptions to prior rulings.51 Moreover, the
APA requires a neutral hearing officer, who is prohibited from participating in ex parte communications,52 to preside over the case and
submit written opinions that provide the legal and factual basis of
the agency’s conclusions.53 In contrast, if formality is not required,
then the APA imposes only minimal procedures for adjudications.54
43. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
44. Id. § 551(5).
45. Id. § 551(6)-(7).
46. Id.
47. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 206 (West 5th ed. 2009); see 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (prescribing procedures for informal rule making); id. § 554 (relating to adjudications);
id. §§ 556-57 (prescribing procedures for formal rule making and formal adjudications).
48. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557.
49. Id. § 556(d). While the majority of formal hearings require oral arguments, the APA
has excepted oral arguments for hearings “determining claims for money or benefits or
application for initial licenses.” Id.
50. Id. Section 556 requires cross-examination only “as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts.” Id.
51. Id. § 557(c).
52. Id. § 557(d)(1).
53. Id. § 557(c)(A)-(B). Additionally, the APA places the burden of proof on the proponent
of the adjudicatory order and requires that the order be supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence. Id. § 556(d). Formal adjudication also requires the agency to provide
notice of the hearing to the parties in the proceeding and afford an opportunity to participate
in the hearing. Id. § 554.
54. Section 555 of the APA does provide some protections that apply to all APA
proceedings, including limited rights to appear before an agency; limits on agency subpoena
power; the right to retain copies of information submitted to an agency; the right to inspect
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Thus, agency decisions made under “informal adjudication” are not
afforded trial-like protections but instead often rely on the use of
“inspections, conferences, and negotiations.”55
The PTO, however, has not historically possessed the authority
to engage in formal adjudication or rule making—the two formal
procedures that Mead indicates would likely warrant deference.56
Although Mead explicitly leaves open the possibility that Chevron
deference could apply to agency actions that are informal in nature,57 this Section purports to establish only that the PTO has not
traditionally engaged in the formal procedures that denote the most
straightforward cases under Mead.
Unlike most notable agencies, the PTO lacks significant substantive rule-making authority. Federal statutes give the Agency the
authority to make rules that “govern the conduct of proceedings in
the Office.”58 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly interpreted this
grant as primarily enabling the PTO to make rules on a variety of
procedural matters.59 Thus, the Agency does not possess the power
to issue binding rules that carry the force of law on the core issues
of patentability, like obviousness or novelty.
The PTO also conducts at least three statutorily authorized
adjudications, although none bear the hallmarks of formal adjudication,60 which could conceivably merit deference. First, Congress
copies of testimony transcripts; and the right to prompt written notice of the denial of any
written petition, application, or request, including a brief explanation of the reasons for the
denial. Id. § 555. As a result, agency procedures in “informal adjudications” are typically
prescribed only under the agency’s enabling act, adopted by the agency itself, or required by
constitutional due process. Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 549 (2007).
55. U.S. ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 5 (1st Sess. 1941).
56. See text accompanying supra note 34.
57. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006).
59. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60. In addition to the three adjudications discussed in this Article, the PTO also conducted
interference proceedings, which have been eliminated by the AIA. The primary purpose of
interference proceedings was to determine which of two parties was the first to invent and
thus deserving of a patent on the invention in question. Although interference proceedings
had several of the signature characteristics of a trial-like proceeding, including limited
discovery and limited oral arguments, it is less clear whether Congress intended such a
proceeding to carry such formality. As Part II.A explains, a statute must typically utilize the
term “hearing” or “on the record” to trigger formal adjudicatory procedures. The statutory
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explicitly delegated to the PTO “all duties required by law respecting the granting and issuing of patents.”61 In order to obtain a
patent, an inventor must file a patent application with the PTO and
try to persuade an officer, known as a patent examiner, that her
invention meets the patentability standards.62 A patent examiner’s
initial validity determination proceeds largely through a series of
negotiations between the patent applicant and the examiner, and
thus is informal in nature.63 As a result, when a party challenges
the PTO’s decision to grant a patent during a declaratory judgment
action or a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit, it is unexceptional that the Federal Circuit fails to strongly defer to the PTO’s
legal interpretations of the Patent Act.64
Second, the PTO has the power to adjudicate patent denials. If a
patent examiner rejects a patent application for failing to meet one
or more of the patentability requirements, then the patent applicant
has a statutory right to pursue an appeal before the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (Board), formerly known as the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences,65 which is composed of administrative
patent judges (APJs).66 Although the process by which the Board
reviews patent rejections is more formal than the PTO’s initial
patentability decisions, it nonetheless fails to resemble trial-like
basis for Board review of interference proceedings fails to utilize these terms. 35 U.S.C.
§ 135(a) (noting that whenever an interference is declared the Board “shall determine
questions of priority of the inventions and may determine questions of patentability”).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a). The PTO “shall be responsible for the granting and issuing of patents
and the registration of trademarks.” Id. § 2(a)(1).
62. Id. § 6.
63. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (calling
patent prosecution “an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant” over the
scope of the invention).
64. The Federal Circuit is technically reviewing the district court’s review of the PTO’s
legal interpretations of the Patent Act. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit affords no judicial
deference to the district court’s, and hence the PTO’s, conclusions of law. See Golden Blount,
Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
65. Note that section 7 of the AIA has restructured the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. See infra note 108 and accompanying
text.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 6. The Secretary of Commerce appoints APJs upon consultation with the
Director of the PTO. Each APJ has a law degree, is admitted to practice law in at least one
state bar, and holds at least a bachelor’s degree in science or engineering. JAMES MOORE ET
AL., A VIEW BEHING [sic] THE CURTAIN: THE BPAI DECISION MAKING PROCESS 2 (Apr. 7, 2010),
http://usptols.org/uploads/A_View_Behind_the_Curtain__6_-UPDATE100408.pdf.
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proceeding associated with formal adjudication.67 Thus, it is not too
surprising that the Federal Circuit has declined to afford Chevron
deference to the PTO’s legal determinations announced during
patent denials, though the appellate court’s adoption of de novo
review is unusual.68
Third, the PTO is statutorily authorized to conduct ex parte
and inter partes reexamination,69 wherein one asks the PTO to
reconsider its decision to grant an already-issued patent.70 These
proceedings also lack the signature characteristics of formal adjudication, as they have been traditionally examinational rather than
adjudicative in nature.71 Neither provides the procedural safeguards
associated with civil trials, such as oral arguments,72 and unlike the
PTO’s review of patent denials, the arbitrator is a member of the
PTO’s examining corps, not an APJ.73 One can appeal the result of

67. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1415, 1434 (1995). Little evidence exists to suggest that Congress intended this proceeding
to be effectuated through formal adjudication. As discussed in Part II.A, a statute must
typically utilize the term “hearing” or “on the record” to trigger formal adjudicatory
procedures. The statutory basis for Board review of patent denials fails to utilize these terms.
35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (“The [Board] shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse
decisions of examiners upon applications for patents.”).
68. In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating, without any analysis, that
the Court would review the PTO’s decision to deny a patent due to nonobviousness de novo);
see 35 U.S.C. § 134 (outlining when a party may seek a Board appeal); id. § 141 (permitting
appeals of Board decisions to the Federal Circuit). An applicant can also undertake civil action
in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Any appeals from the District Court of the
District of Columbia involving patent denials can then be appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id.
§ 145 (permitting appeals of Board decisions to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia).
69. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303.
70. Id.
71. These proceedings also suffer from severe limitations set on third-party participation,
having narrow substantive grounds for review and strict estoppel provisions. Only inter
partes reexamination allows for third-party participation on the merits of the patent’s
validity, and even then only in a limited manner: the third party has the right to file written
comments addressing “issues raised by the Office action or the patent owner’s response.” 37
C.F.R. § 1.947 (2006); see also id. § 1.550(g) (“The active participation of the ex parte
reexamination requester ends with the reply pursuant to § 1.535, and no further submissions
on behalf of the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or considered.”).
72. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303.
73. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.937(a) (“All inter partes reexamination proceedings ... will be
conducted with special dispatch within the office.”); see also id. § 1.550(a) (same with regard
to ex parte proceedings).
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a reexamination proceeding to the Board.74 Similar to Board review
of patent denials, the Board’s process lacks the distinctive features
associated with formal adjudication.75 Akin to the PTO’s patent
denials, the Federal Circuit has held that the Agency’s legal determinations announced during ex parte and inter partes reexamination proceedings are entitled to no deference.76
The recently enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act provides
the PTO with additional adjudicatory powers and concomitantly
adds another pathway by which third parties can challenge the
validity of an already-issued patent.77 Among other things, the AIA
significantly modified inter partes reexamination, renaming the
transformed procedure “inter partes review,”78 and created an
entirely new postgrant opposition procedure called “post-grant
74. 35 U.S.C. § 134(b)-(c).
75. As Part II.A explains, a statute must typically utilize the term “hearing” or “on the
record” to trigger formal adjudicatory procedures. The statutory basis for Board review of
reexamination proceedings fails to utilize these terms. Id. § 134(b) (noting that a patent owner
“may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the [Board]”);
id. § 134(c) (noting that a third-party request “may appeal to the [Board] the final decision of
the primary examiner favorable to the patentability of any original or proposed amended or
new claim of the patent”).
76. See, e.g., In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the Federal
Circuit must review the PTO’s legal decisions announced during reexamination proceedings
de novo).
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit’s holding that patent denials, reexamination proceedings,
and interference proceedings do not constitute formal adjudications did not turn on the
formality associated with the procedures but instead on the fact that a party to such a
proceeding had the right to appeal the Board’s decision either directly to the Federal Circuit
or to U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Citing § 554(a)(1), which excludes
agency adjudication from the requirements of trial-type procedures set forth in §§ 556 and 557
“when the subject matter of that adjudication is subject to subsequent trial de novo,” the
Federal Circuit reasoned that because a patent applicant can submit new evidence that was
not before the PTO during the district court proceeding, the PTO’s adjudications are not
formal. See Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 867-68 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d
1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2012) (noting that
applicants can submit new evidence in a proceeding for the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia). Regardless of the merits of the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, the new postgrant
review proceeding and inter partes review allow appeal only to the Federal Circuit—not the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7(b), 125 Stat. 284,
314 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 141(c)). It is well established that the Federal Circuit
must review the PTO’s decision on the same administrative record that was before the PTO.
Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. at 1694 (noting there is “no opportunity for the applicant to offer new
evidence [before the Federal Circuit]”).
77. AIA, 125 Stat. 284 (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
78. Id. § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 299-304 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319).

2013]

THE CHANGING GUARD OF PATENT LAW

1977

review.”79 Whereas inter partes and postgrant review differ in certain aspects,80 they share a host of common features that set them
squarely apart from their predecessors. The most revolutionary
facet of the new and modified administrative hearings is the type of
proceedings by which they must be effectuated. The AIA requires
that both inter partes review and postgrant review take place in an
adversarial, court-like proceeding, wherein parties are entitled to
oral arguments and discovery.81 In addition, a panel of APJs, rather
than the examining corps, conducts the initial review of the patent.82
The AIA is silent as to the deference owed to the PTO’s legal determinations announced during the inter partes and postgrant review.
As the inter partes review and postgrant review generally share the
same procedural requirements for effectuation, and it is the formality of these procedures that is critical to this Article’s argument,
inter partes and postgrant review will hereinafter be referred to
collectively as “postgrant review.”
II. POSTGRANT REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
This Section argues that an application of administrative law
principles to the new and modified postgrant review proceedings
triggers Chevron deference for the PTO’s interpretation of ambigu79. Id. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 305-11 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-329).
80. For example, inter partes review becomes available only after nine months of patent
grant or after the expiration of the postgrant review proceeding if one has been initiated,
whereas the postgrant review procedure is available only within nine months of the grant of
a patent. Id. § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 299 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1)); id. § 6(d), 125
Stat. at 306 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321(c)). Moreover, the standard for instituting a
postgrant review proceeding requires a showing that it is more likely than not that at least
one claim will be found invalid, whereas to institute an inter partes review proceeding, the
request must show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the request would prevail with
respect to at least one claim. Id. § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 300 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 314); id.
§ 6(d), 125 Stat. at 306 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 324). Perhaps the biggest difference is
that in a postgrant review proceeding, like in district court, the petitioner can argue any
ground of invalidity raised under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including novelty, obviousness, statutory
subject matter, written description, enablement, or definiteness, AIA § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 306
(to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321(b)), whereas in inter partes review proceedings, like ex parte
and the preexisting inter partes reexamination proceedings, the PTO will consider only
novelty or obviousness arguments based on patents or printed publications. Id. § 6(a), 125
Stat. at 299 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)).
81. See infra note 101.
82. AIA § 7(a), 125 Stat. at 313 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6(a)-(b)(1)).
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ous terms of the Patent Act announced during these proceedings. In
making the case that the PTO should have primary interpretative
authority over the key patentability requirements, this Section
proceeds by focusing exclusively on the Chevron step zero inquiry:
Did Congress intend for the PTO, which has the sole authority to
adjudicate the validity of patent applications,83 to have interpretative authority over the Patent Act? This Section concludes that
Congress intended for the Agency to be the chief expositor of the
core patentability standards. The conclusion rests on the establishment of only two principles. First, Congress intended the PTO to
effectuate the postgrant review proceedings through formal adjudication. Second, this grant of formal adjudicatory power accompanied
a delegation of interpretative authority. With respect to establishing
the latter premise, this Section proceeds by developing a conceptual
framework for determining when a grant of formal adjudicatory
authority is sufficient to infer the ability to speak with the force of
law and then turns to addressing conceivable counterarguments.
Finally, this Section provides a theoretical basis for rejecting the
dominant approach in the split among circuit courts on the proper
method for determining the triggering provision of formal procedures.
A. Formality and the Postgrant Review Proceedings
To determine the level of formality that must accompany the
postgrant review proceedings called for by the America Invents Act,
the PTO must interpret the AIA in light of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).84 Section 554 of the APA states that the
language “in every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,”
triggers the formal procedures outlined in § 554 and §§ 556-557.85
Thus, if the phrases “hearing” and “on the record” are both present
in the AIA, formal adjudications are required.86
83. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006).
84. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C.).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2006).
86. See Berry, supra note 54, at 551-52 (“[N]o one would dispute that formal procedures
should be required if the enabling statute includes ‘on the record’ language.”).
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However, like many other statutes, the AIA utilizes the term
“hearing” without the phrase “on the record.” Specifically, the AIA
states that the postgrant review proceedings must provide “either
party with the right to an oral hearing as part of the proceeding.”87
Circuit courts have taken divergent approaches when confronted
with such enabling statutes. Until 1984, the courts of appeals generally followed one of two approaches: presumption in favor of formal procedures88 or presumption against them.89 The Supreme
Court’s Chevron decision resulted in a third approach in which
courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of whether a
hearing requires formal or informal adjudication.90
Because the Federal Circuit has yet to face this issue, this Section
briefly examines, and then applies, the three different approaches
to the AIA taken by circuit courts with respect to the triggering
provisions of formal adjudication.91 Since Mead cautions that only
congressional conferrals of formal adjudicatory authority are
generally sufficient to satisfy the force-of-law requirement,92 this
Section also examines the extent to which each approach turns on
the intent of Congress.
1. Opposing Presumptions
In Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, the First Circuit
established a presumption that, without congressional intent to the
contrary, the statutory requirement of a hearing triggers the formal
procedures in § 554 and §§ 556-557.93 In City of West Chicago v. U.S.
87. AIA § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 309 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(10)).
88. See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978),
superseded by rule, Dominion Energy Brayton Point, L.L.C. v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.
2006).
89. See, e.g., City of W. Chi. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th
Cir. 1983).
90. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
91. The Federal Circuit has yet to weigh in on this matter.
92. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
93. 572 F.2d at 878. Seacoast involved the question of whether the statutory language
“after opportunity for public hearing” required the Environmental Protection Agency to
comply with the APA’s formal adjudicatory requirements in issuing a permit under the Clean
Water Act. Id. at 875-76. The First Circuit asserted that the touchstone of its decision was the
intent of Congress. Id. at 876. By drawing on the APA’s legislative history, the court reasoned
that Congress intended agency decisions that involved “specific factual findings” affecting “the
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Seventh Circuit adopted the
exact opposite presumption, noting that when the statute lacked the
“on the record” language, clear congressional “intent to trigger the
formal, on-the-record hearing provisions of the APA” must be
present to require formal procedures.94 While Seacoast and West
Chicago established opposing presumptions that can be rebutted by
evidence of congressional intent,95 the majority of subsequent cases
that purport to apply either opinion rarely, if ever, reason in the
language of presumptions. Instead, these ensuing opinions almost
exclusively focus on the intent of Congress, suggesting that the
presumption for or against formal procedures is quite fragile.96
rights of the specific applicant,” like the one at issue, to be governed by adversarial hearings,
as formal procedures both increase the quality of the decisional process within the agency and
enable more meaningful judicial review by creating a record. Id. at 876-77.
94. 701 F.2d at 641. At issue was whether the language “shall grant a hearing” in
section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act required the Nuclear Regulatory Committee to
provide a hearing that complied with the formal procedures of the APA in issuing a nuclear
material license amendment. Id. Taking a more textualist approach, the court noted that
although the words “on the record” were not a necessary prerequisite to finding formal
procedures were required, when this language is absent, clear congressional “intent to trigger
the formal, on-the-record hearing provisions of the APA” must be present to require formal
procedures. Id. After reviewing the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act, the court
found no clear intention that formal hearings were required during amendments to material
licenses. Id.
95. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 47, at 240 (“Seacoast and West Chicago offer dueling
presumptions.”).
96. See, e.g., Five Points Rd. Joint Venture v. Johanns, 542 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 2008)
(noting that the absence of the “on the record” requirement is not dispositive, but that
“Congress need only ‘clearly indicate its intent to trigger the formal, on-the-record hearing
provisions of the APA’” (quoting W. Chi., 701 F.2d at 641)); Citizens Awareness Network, Inc.
v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 348 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he degree of formality that a hearing
must afford does not necessarily turn on the presence or absence of [the phrase ‘on the
record’]. If ... the nature of the hearing that Congress intended to grant is clear, then that
intention governs.”); Lane v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 120 F.3d 106, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating
that the absence of the “on the record” requirement is not dispositive, but that “Congress need
only ‘clearly indicate its intent to trigger the formal, on-the-record hearing provision of the
APA.’” (quoting W. Chi., 701 F.2d at 641)); Friends of the Earth v. Reilly, 966 F.2d 690, 693
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting the absence of the “on the record” requirement is not dispositive but
“[w]hat counts is whether the statute indicates that Congress intended to require full agency
adherence to all section 554 procedures components.” (quoting St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co.
v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 448-49 (D.C. Circuit 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); St.
Louis Fuel, 890 F.2d at 448-49 (finding that the absence of the “on the record” requirement
is not dispositive, but “[w]hat counts is whether the statute indicates that Congress intended
to require full agency adherence to all section 554 procedural components”); Buttrey v. United
States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that there are “many different kinds of
‘hearing,’ and resolution of the issue must turn on ‘the substantive nature of the hearing
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Moreover, while courts generally agree on the type of evidence that
is relevant in determining congressional intent—the text,97 structure,98 and legislative history99 of the statute in question—they
substantially vary on the sufficiency of evidence needed to evince
the intent of Congress.100 As a result, examining the type of hearing
Congress intended with respect to the postgrant review proceedings
is imperative to the application of either of the presumptive approaches.
Perhaps the strongest argument that Congress intended the
postgrant review proceedings to be effectuated through formal
procedures is found within the language of the AIA itself. The Act
requires the PTO to allow oral arguments and discovery as part of
the postgrant review proceedings.101 The requirement of oral
Congress intended to provide’” (quoting Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 876)).
97. See, e.g., Five Points, 542 F.3d at 1126 (noting that “the language of the text ...
[including] the provision[s] for trial-type procedures” is indicative of congressional intent that
formal procedures be used); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d
1534, 1541 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that if “a statute provides that an adjudication be
determined at least in part based on an agency hearing,” it is sufficient to trigger formal
procedures).
98. See, e.g., Five Points, 542 F.3d at 1126.
99. See, e.g., St. Louis Fuel, 890 F.2d at 449 (finding that in floor statements Congress did
“not grant quite as many procedural safeguards to the person subjected to agency action as
does [sic] sections 554 and 556 of the Administrative Procedures Act” to be largely dispositive
that Congress intended only informal procedures to be utilized (quoting 123 CONG. REC.
17,403 (1977))); Buttrey, 690 F.2d at 1175 (finding remarks by a senator in presenting the
committee report that Congress “did not wish to create a burdensome bureaucracy in light of
the fact that a system to issue permits already existed” as evidence that Congress intended
only informal procedures to be utilized (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 33,699 (1972) (prepared
remarks of Sen. Muskie))).
100. Although a few opinions appear to require a clear statement in the legislative history
that Congress intended formal procedures to be adopted, the vast majority of cases find
sufficient intent based on a less stringent substantiation. While West Chicago appears to
require an authoritative statement in the legislative history to rebut the presumption, see
supra note 94, most courts, even subsequent Seventh Circuit opinions, have not required such
a high threshold. See, e.g., Five Points, 542 F.3d at 1126. For example, some courts have found
that the judicial review of the Agency’s adjudication is required by statute or the nature of the
substantive rights; see infra note 111, which supports a finding of formal procedures.
101. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284, 302 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 316(a)(5)) (noting that the Director shall promulgate regulations governing the conduct of
inter partes review that set “forth standards and procedures for discovery of relevant
evidence”); id. § 6(a), 125 Stat. at 302 (to be codified at § 316(a)(10)) (stating that the Director
shall promulgate regulations governing inter partes review that provide “either party with
the right to an oral hearing as part of the proceeding”); id. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 308 (to be
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5)) (noting that the Director shall promulgate regulations
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arguments alone meets a number of the formal adjudicatory protections required by the APA.102 Further, the mandate of discovery
for postgrant review proceedings goes beyond the more minimally
prescribed protections in the APA for formal adjudications.103
Because discovery is a hallmark of adversarial proceedings and the
procedural protections set by the APA for formal adjudications are
understood to mimic the protections afforded by trial-like proceedings,104 it seems unlikely that Congress would require the PTO to
adopt formal procedures that surpass the expectations of the APA
while not also intending for the PTO to adopt the more nominal
procedures outlined in the APA. In other words, it seems illogical
that Congress would require discovery to be used during postgrant
review proceedings only to take away any meaningful use of the
procedure—for example, by not requiring the PTO to prohibit, as the
APA requires for formal adjudications, ex parte communications
regarding the merits during the decisional process.105
Moreover, the AIA also calls for the PTO to promulgate regulations regarding other trial-type dealings, such as prescribing sanc-

governing the conduct of postgrant review that set “forth standards and procedures for
discovery of relevant evidence”); id. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 309 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 326(a)(10)) (stating that the Director shall promulgate regulations governing postgrant
review that provide “either party with the right to an oral hearing as part of the proceeding”).
102. For example, APA protections for formal adjudications, such as providing parties the
opportunity to participate in the hearing and to submit evidence to support their case, are met
simply by mandating oral arguments. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(c), 556(d) (2006). In some formal
hearings—that is, those “determining claims for money or benefits or application for initial
licenses”—agencies do not have to allow oral arguments. Id. § 556(d). However, none of these
exceptions apply to patent decisions.
103. See id. § 556 (stating that the APA does not explicitly require discovery in formal
adjudication); see also Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 350
(1st Cir. 2004) (same). The scope of discovery is larger for postgrant review proceedings than
inter partes review. See AIA § 6(a), (d), 125 Stat. at 302, 309 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 316(a)(5), 326(a)(5)).
104. United States v. Indep. Bulk Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 474, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(“[T]he phrase ‘adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing’ in section 554 of the APA should be interpreted to mean
‘an adjudication required to be determined after opportunity for a trial, or for a trial-type
hearing, or for a formal hearing.’” (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 10.7, at 329-30 (2d ed. 1978))); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
243 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]ormal adjudication ... is modeled after the process used
in trial courts.”).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d).
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tions for attorney misconduct106 and providing protective orders
governing the exchange of confidential information.107 Even though
these requirements do not necessarily involve expanding the protections afforded by the APA, they do provide further evidence that
Congress envisioned that the postgrant review proceedings would
be governed by adverse, trial-like adjudications. Finally, the fact
that the statute renames the Patent Board of Appeals and Interferences, which is responsible for conducting the postgrant review
proceedings, to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, further evinces
that Congress intended the postgrant review proceedings to be
effectuated by adversarial hearings.108
Beyond the language of the AIA, its legislative history clearly
shows that Congress understood the Act to “convert[ ] inter partes
reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding”109 while establishing a new procedure known as postgrant
review that “would take place in a court-like proceeding.”110 The
repeated reference to trial-like proceedings in the legislative history
of the AIA further substantiates Congress’s intent for postgrant
review proceedings to be afforded formal adjudicatory protections.111
106. AIA § 6(a), (d), 125 Stat. at 302, 308-09 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(6),
326(a)(6)).
107. Id. § 6(a), (d), 125 Stat. at 302 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(7), 326(a)(7)).
108. Id. § 7(a), 125 Stat. at 313 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 6); see also H.R. REP. NO. 11298, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (“The Act renames the Patent Board the ‘Patent Trial and Appeal
Board.’”). Additional evidence of the PTO’s belief can be found in the Agency’s repeated
referral to the postgrant review proceedings as trials. See, e.g., Rules of Practice for Trials
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Judicial Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board
Decisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 6879, 6907 (proposed Feb. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 42,
90) [hereinafter Rules of Practice] (“A petition to institute a trial must be filed .... § 42.4
Notice of trial.... Institution of trial.”).
109. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46.
110. Id. at 68.
111. See supra note 108. Additionally, some courts are more likely to require formal
procedures when specific factual findings with potential for “serious impact on private rights”
are at issue in the adjudication, see, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Reilly, 966 F.2d 690, 693
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[I]t seems to us that it is the nature of the issues to be resolved in the
withdrawal proceeding which is determinative.”); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,
572 F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir. 1978), superseded by rule, Dominion Energy Brayton Point, L.L.C.
v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[P]roceedings ... conducted in order ‘to adjudicate
disputed facts in particular cases’ ... [are] exactly the kind of quasi-judicial proceedings for
which the adjudicatory procedures of the APA were intended.” (quoting Marathon Oil Co. v.
EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 1997))), and when judicial review of the agency’s
adjudication is required by statute, see, e.g., Seacoast, 572 F.2d at 876 n.6 (“[W]e consider it

1984

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1959

If the Federal Circuit follows or the Supreme Court chooses to
endorse Seacoast, the AIA language calling for a “hearing” will
trigger formal adjudication, as there is little evidence that Congress
intended for the PTO to utilize informal proceedings. However, if
courts endorse West Chicago, whether a formal adjudication is
triggered becomes a much closer call because the strength of the
presumption—or the sufficiency of evidence necessary to provide
congressional intent—will be largely determinative. Courts that
adopt a strong presumption or require a high threshold of congressional intent may conclude that informal procedures are sufficient.
However, courts that adopt a weak presumption or a low threshold
of congressional intent are likely to hold that the PTO must effectuate the postgrant review proceedings through formal adjudication,
as there is ample evidence to suggest that Congress intended formal procedures to be used. As congressional intent is the touchstone
of the presumptive approaches, a court that determines that the
PTO must utilize formal adjudicatory procedures to effectuate the
postgrant review proceedings under either of these approaches is
necessarily also concluding that Congress intended that the PTO
implement postgrant review proceedings through formal adjudication.
2. The Chevron Approach
While deciding the issue for the first time since 1984, the D.C.
Circuit established a third approach, which has become the dominant framework,112 when it applied the Chevron two-step test to an
significant that [the statute in question] provides for judicial review.”); U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Train, 556 F.2d 822, 833 (7th Cir. 1977), abandoned by City of W. Chi. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that judicial review weighs toward
finding formal procedures). Both of these indicators are present with respect to the postgrant
review proceedings. The AIA allows a dissatisfied party to a postgrant review proceeding to
appeal the Agency’s decision to the Federal Circuit. AIA § 7(c), 125 Stat. at 313 (to be codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 141(c)) (“A party to an inter partes review or a post-grant review who is
dissatisfied with the final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ... may
appeal the Board’s decision only to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.”). The AIA also makes clear that the invalidation of a patent can have a serious
impact on private rights. See id.
112. For example, the First Circuit has subsequently followed the approach of the D.C.
Circuit. See Dominion Energy, 443 F.3d at 17-18 (holding that Chevron, not Seacoast,
governs).
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agency’s interpretation of the word “hearing.”113 The D.C. Circuit
noted that the statutory hearing provision, without more, was
ambiguous.114 Instead of using the inherent ambiguity as the basis
for a judicial presumption for or against a formal, trial-type proceeding, the court deferred to the expertise of administrative
officials in designing a hearing process that best fit the decision that
an agency was congressionally authorized to make.115
If the Federal Circuit chooses to follow the D.C. Circuit’s approach, under step one of Chevron, it will consider “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,”116 or
whether the statutory hearing provision in the AIA is ambiguous.
To answer this question, the Federal Circuit will consider the “text,
structure, purpose, and history” of the AIA, as well as the AIA’s relationship to other statutes.117 As discussed, both the statutory language and the legislative history of the AIA support the notion that
Congress intended formal procedures to be utilized.118 Nonetheless,
for the purposes of the Chevron analysis it is helpful to consider the
possibility that the Federal Circuit may find the statutory hearing
provision in the AIA ambiguous.
In Chevron step two, the reviewing court must determine whether
the PTO’s interpretation of the provision is “based on a permissible
construction” or “reasonable construction” of the AIA.119 The PTO
recently proposed regulations for conduct involving postgrant review

113. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, involved a challenge to the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) procedural rules for administrative enforcement proceedings
against hazardous waste facilities. 873 F.2d 1477, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The EPA had
interpreted its enabling statute, which called for an opportunity for public hearing without
utilizing “on the record” language, to require formal procedures. Id. at 1481. Congress
amended EPA’s enabling act to create new EPA proceedings. The amendments, however,
required the hearing provision in the original statute to be applicable to the new proceedings.
The EPA adopted informal proceedings for a subset of these new proceedings. Applying the
Chevron framework, the court held that the EPA’s informal procedures satisfied the statutory
hearing requirement. Id. at 1482.
114. Id. at 1482.
115. Id.
116. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
117. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004).
118. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
119. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840, 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”).
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proceedings that provide for trial-type protections afforded under
formal adjudication, including the APA requirements of § 554 and
§§ 556-557.120 Although the Supreme Court has never definitively
120. For example, the regulations require the Agency to do the following: (1) provide notice
of any postgrant review proceedings, compare APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2006), with Rules of
Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. 6879, 6907, 6909 (proposed Feb. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts.
42, 90) (“§ 42.4 Notice of trial” and “§ 42.21 Notice of basis for relief”); (2) prohibit ex parte
communications regarding the merits during the decisional process, compare 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(d), with Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 6908 (“§ 42.5(d) Ex parte communications.
Communication regarding a specific proceeding with a Board member ... is not permitted
unless both parties have an opportunity to be involved in the communication.”); (3) allow, in
certain circumstances, the right to conduct cross-examination, compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), with
Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 6911 (“§ 42.53(c)(2) Cross-examination should ordinarily
take place after any supplemental evidence relating to the direct testimony has been filed.”);
(4) permit parties to seek a rehearing of the initial three-judge panel decision, compare 5
U.S.C. § 557(b), with Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 6913 (“§ 42.71(c) Rehearing. A party
dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing.”); (5) afford parties an
opportunity to participate in those proceedings, compare 5 U.S.C. § 554(c), with Changes to
Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7041, 7059 (proposed Feb. 10, 2012)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (“§ 42.101 ... A person who is not the owner of a patent may
file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”), and Changes
to Implement Post-Grant Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7060, 7079 (proposed Feb. 10,
2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (“§ 42.201 ... A person who is not the owner of a
patent may file with the Office a petition to institute a post-grant review of the patent.”); (6)
place the burden of proof on the moving party to establish that she is entitled to the requested
relief, compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), with Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 6909 (“§ 42.20(c) ...
The moving party has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested
relief.”); and (7) ensure that parties to the formal adjudications are entitled to present their
case by documentary evidence, compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), with Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 6909-10 (“§ 42.21 Notice of basis for relief” and “§ 42.22 Content of petitions and motions”).
Typically the hearing officers in a formal adjudication are administrative law judges. See
5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (requiring that the head of the agency, one or more members of the collegial
body that heads an agency, or administrative law judges serve as hearing officers in a formal
proceeding). The America Invents Act requires that a panel of three APJs, who are defined
as “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability,” AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 7(a), 125 Stat. 284, 313 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 6(a)), not administrative law
judges, preside over the proceeding. Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 6907 (“§ 42.2 Definitions
... Panel means at least three members of the Board ... [and] Board means ... a panel of the
Board or a member or employee acting with the authority of the Board.”). In general,
administrative patent judges enjoy less independence in their decision making than do
administrative law judges. See Judith Resnik, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First
Century: Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1145-46 (2006). However,
not all formal adjudications must be presided over by one of the three hearing officers outlined
in § 556(b) if the organic statute specifically designated another board or employee to preside.
Section 556(b) states, “This subchapter does not supersede the conduct of specified classes of
proceedings, in whole or in part, by or before boards or other employees specially provided for
by or designated under statute.” The America Invents Act does explicitly require that “[t]he
Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall ... conduct each post-grant review instituted under this
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defined when an agency’s interpretation would be reasonable, it has
stated that in order to uphold an agency’s interpretation, a court
need not determine if the agency’s construction was the best interpretation of a statute or the interpretation that the court would
have chosen.121 Beyond this guidance, however, the Chevron step
two analysis is not well defined. The Federal Circuit appears to
oscillate between, and sometimes apply both of, the two most
prevalent types of analysis: examination of statutory materials to
evince legislative intent122 and evaluation of the agency’s reasoning
process.123 If the Federal Circuit adopts the former analysis, it will
likely find the PTO’s interpretation reasonable. After all, as discussed above, both the language and the legislative history of the
AIA support the notion that Congress intended the postgrant review

chapter.” § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 309 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 326(c)); see also id. § 6(a), 125
Stat. at 303 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 316(c)) (“The Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall
... conduct each inter partes review instituted under this chapter.”). Thus, the PTO’s
regulations requiring that the hearing officers of postgrant review be APJs also conforms with
APA requirements for formal adjudication.
Beyond the APA’s mandated protections, the PTO regulations also set forth general policies
regarding other trial-type procedures, at least some of which are mandated by the AIA, such
as sanctions against a party for misconduct, compare Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. at 6909
(“§ 42.12 Sanctions”), with AIA § 6(a), (d), 125 Stat. at 302, 308-09 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 316(a)(6), 326(a)(6)), compelling testimony and production, Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 6910 (“§ 42.52 Compelling testimony and production”), and expert testimony, id. at 6912
(“§ 42.65 Expert testimony; tests and data”).
121. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11 (“The court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction,
or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding.”); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005) (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously
forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill,
displaces a conflicting agency construction.”).
122. See, e.g., Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir.) (considering
legislative history of the Act in question to determine if the Agency’s interpretation was
reasonable), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1038 (2007). Commentators have argued that considering
statutory materials in step two is awkward at best and unsatisfactory at worst, as the Federal
Circuit is largely repeating the analysis under step one at step two. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin,
The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1276 (1997).
123. See, e.g., Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 495 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(considering the process utilized by an agency during its decision making to determine if the
agency’s interpretation was reasonable). Commentators have noted that considering the
reasonableness of the agency’s decisional process in Chevron step two tends to merge with
review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 122, at 126769.

1988

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1959

proceedings to be effectuated through formal adjudication.124 If the
Federal Circuit considers the PTO’s reasoning process, then it is
difficult to state definitively whether the PTO would pass Chevron
step two, as the Agency has not specifically stated its motives for
adopting formal procedures. Nevertheless, this Article has argued
that effectuating postgrant review through formal adjudication is
both reasonable and logically coherent.125 Thus, as long as the PTO
defends its choice to implement formal procedures by pointing to
such reasoned decision making, the Agency’s decision should be
upheld.
Importantly, a court that adopts the dominant Chevron approach,
and holds both that the term “hearing” in the AIA is ambiguous and
that the PTO’s decision to adopt formal adjudicatory procedures is
reasonable, is also necessarily concluding that Congress intended to
delegate interpretative authority to the PTO to determine the level
of formality that should accompany the postgrant review proceedings. The latter delegation is larger than a grant of formal
adjudicatory powers alone. Thus, a court that applies the Chevron
framework and holds the use of formal procedures permissible is
also determining that Congress intended the postgrant review proceedings to be effectuated by formal adjudication.
Finally, it should be noted that the PTO could choose to adopt
more formal proceedings than Congress intended. Thus, if the
Federal Circuit held that Congress did not intend for postgrant
review to be effectuated through formal adjudication, the Agency
may nevertheless adopt formal proceedings if it believes such
procedures are prudent. In such a circumstance, the PTO’s utilization of formal adjudication would not be sufficient to conclude that
the Agency was granted force-of-law authority. As discussed above,
the key inquiry to a force-of-law determination is the intent of
Congress. As a result, the determining factor is whether Congress
intended an agency to have formal adjudicatory powers, not whether
an agency elects to utilize more formal procedures than Congress
required.
In summary, it appears that only if courts adopt the approach of
a presumption against formal procedures along with a high thres124. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
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hold for overturning the presumption, will they conclude that
Congress did not require the Agency to utilize formal procedures in
effectuating the postgrant review proceedings. If courts choose
either to follow (1) the Chevron approach, (2) the presumption for
formal procedures, or (3) the presumption against formal procedures
but nonetheless choose to adopt a weak presumption, then the
courts will conclude that Congress intended the PTO to adopt formal
procedures when implementing the postgrant review proceedings.
As a result, this Section concludes that a court will likely find that
Congress desired the postgrant review proceedings to be effectuated
through formal adjudication.
B. Force-of-Law Prerequisite
This Section examines whether the congressional conferral of
formal adjudicatory powers to the PTO is sufficient to infer that the
Agency has the ability to speak with the “force of law.”126 The
Section begins by developing a conceptual framework to determine
when a grant of formal adjudicatory authority would be sufficient to
infer a delegation of interpretative authority. The Section then
turns to explore conceivable counterarguments.
At first glance, the application of the force-of-law concept to the
PTO’s postgrant review proceedings appears to be relatively
straightforward. The Mead Court was quite explicit that a congressional conferral of formal adjudicatory authority and exercise
thereof generally satisfy the force-of-law requirement.127 Thus, if a
court determines that Congress intended the postgrant review proceedings to be effectuated through formal adjudication, the PTO’s
interpretations of ambiguous terms of the Patent Act announced
during postgrant review proceedings should be entitled to Chevron
deference. Of course, Mead states that a congressional conferral of
formal adjudicatory authority is a “very good indicator” that
Congress intended to delegate legislative power to an agency, not
126. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001); see also supra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text.
127. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process
of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is
claimed.”).
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that it is dispositive of the intent of Congress.128 If a subset of grants
of formal adjudicatory authority exists that is insufficient to trigger
the application of the Chevron framework, just what are the characteristics of these inadequate grants?
To date, the force-of-law requirement, especially in the context of
formal adjudications, has suffered from a lack of judicial guidance
and scholarly attention.129 One exception is the scholarship of
Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman, who have argued in favor of
equating the force-of-law requirement with the power to render
binding formal adjudication.130 Merrill and Hickman admit that
their approach fails to explain Supreme Court precedent, thus the
binding requirement is, at best, a significant indicator of congressional delegation.131 Nevertheless, to the extent Merrill and Hickman’s
rule demarcates the types of formal adjudication that are sufficient
but not necessary to meet the delegation of interpretative authority,
it still provides valuable insight when applied to the PTO context.
The PTO’s legal decisions on the validity of a patent during a postgrant review proceeding are binding on all individuals who were
parties to the hearing.132 Thus, under Merrill and Hickman’s more

128. Id. at 229.
129. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deferences, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1601 (2006) (“The ‘force of law’ concept [is] a vague concept
for which the Court has provided only minimal guidance.”). Scholars and courts tend to
conclude that a grant of formal adjudicatory power is accompanied with force-of-law authority.
See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 14, at 328; Kumar, supra note 37, at 1569; Rai, supra
note 14, at 1280. Scholars have developed the concept in the context of rule making a bit more.
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 470-72
(2013) [hereinafter Hickman, Unpacking]; Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and
Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 827-30 (2002); Merrill
& Watts, supra note 37, at 472.
130. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 31, at 890 (“An agency is charged with administering
a statute only if it has been given delegated power to bind persons outside the agency with
the force of law.”). Merrill and Hickman posit that any type of adjudication—not just formal
adjudication—with binding effect is sufficient to meet the force-of-law requirement. Id.
131. The Court has routinely extended Chevron deference to the National Labor Relations
Board’s (NLRB) legal positions adopted during formal adjudication, even though the NLRB
is not empowered to issue orders that immediately bind the parties. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin
Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
483, 500 (1978); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); Merrill & Hickman,
supra note 31, at 892 (“Thus, it appears that the force-of-law criterion is arguably
underinclusive [in the context of the NLRB].”).
132. 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2006).
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stringent conceptualization of the force-of-law requirement, the
Chevron framework would be applicable to the PTO.
Along a similar vein, Thomas Merrill suggested that a key variable in determining whether a grant of formal adjudication carries
the power to speak with the force of law is the presence or absence
of congressionally imposed sanctions or other adverse consequences
for individuals who violate a policy announced during an agency’s
adjudication.133 Similar to the binding requirement, Merrill readily
admits that courts have failed to follow this approach consistently.134 However, to the extent that penalties or other adverse consequences represent a sufficient but not necessary condition to infer
a congressional delegation of power to act with the force of law, their
application to the PTO is fruitful. Patent applicants who fail to heed
the PTO’s legal decisions announced during postgrant review will
suffer a denial of their patent application.135 Thus, again, an application of the adverse-consequence or penalty indicator provides for
Chevron deference to the PTO’s legal determinations announced
during postgrant review.
Although the binding and penalty indicators are conceptually
appealing, the fact that contemporary courts have not always acted
consistently with these approaches suggests that further exploration
of the force-of-law concept is warranted.136 From a fundamental
perspective, granting an agency formal adjudicatory authority that
carries the power to speak with the force of law necessarily means
that Congress intended the agency to make law and policy—or generalized determinations that may affect the rights of many—during
its adjudications.137 To date, the Supreme Court has near uniformly
equated a grant of formal adjudicatory authority with the ability to
speak with the force of law. In one of the few, possibly only, times
the Supreme Court has found a conferral of formal adjudicatory
133. See Merrill, supra note 129, at 827-30.
134. Id. at 831-32 (noting that although both the Food and Drug Administration and the
NLRB “have grants of rulemaking authority that include no provision for sanctions or other
adverse consequences for rule violations,” these agencies’ rules are afforded Chevron
deference).
135. Changes to Implement Post-Grant Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7060, 7079
(proposed Feb. 10, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
136. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
137. See Merrill, supra note 129, at 827-29; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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powers to an agency insufficient to infer a delegation of interpretative authority, the Court faced resolving a dispute among two
agencies regarding the interpretation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSH Act) of 1970. More specifically, Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission involved a splitenforcement model, wherein one agency, the Secretary of Labor, had
rule-making authority and another agency, the Health Review
Commission, had formal adjudicatory powers.138 In concluding that
the Health Review Commission lacked interpretative authority over
the OSH Act, the Court emphasized that Congress intended the
Health Review Commission to possess only the ability to make
“findings of fact” and apply already-determined law “to those facts
in making a decision.”139 According to the Court, Congress intended
the Commission to be viewed as nothing more than a “neutral
arbiter.”140
The Court’s conception that an agency charged only with factfinding in individualized disputes lacks the ability to speak with the
force of law suggests that the key inquiry in determining whether
an agency has legislative power turns on Congress’s intent when it
prescribed formal adjudication procedures: whether Congress intended the agency to act simply as a highly stylized adjudicator
—deciding fact-intensive issues between parties—or whether it also
intended the agency to make policy or law that affects the rights of
many people. Under this conceptualization of a delegation of interpretative authority, strong evidence exists that Congress intended
the PTO to speak with the force of law when it granted the Agency
the power to partake in postgrant review.141 Congress did not view
138. 499 U.S. 144, 155 (1991).
139. The Court gave substantial weight to the fact that Congress granted rule-making
authority to the Secretary and concluded that the Secretary, not the Commission, possessed
interpretative authority over the OSH Act. Id. at 152-53. However, as discussed infra Part
II.B.2, the Court has made clear that Chevron deference is not limited only to agencies that
possess rule-making authority.
A number of lower courts that have held that the adjudicatory agency in a splitenforcement model lacks policy-making power also emphasized that the adjudicatory agency’s
powers were limited to fact-finding only. See, e.g., Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d
1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that when an agency has a grant of formal adjudicatory
power but lacks a policy-making function, it means “the agency was charged only with fact
finding”).
140. Martin, 499 U.S. at 155.
141. I use the term postgrant review in this paragraph—and only in this paragraph—not
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postgrant review proceedings solely as an apparatus for determining
individualized, factual disputes. Instead, the AIA envisioned the
exact opposite. The AIA specifically states that postgrant review
proceedings are to be used to decide “novel or unsettled legal question[s] that [are] important to other patents or patent applications”142—or in other words, used to announce rules that govern a
group of individuals. This statutory language provides strong support that Congress intended postgrant review to be accompanied
with a policy-making or law-making ability.
This conclusion is further substantiated by the fact that the
statutory basis for invalidating a patent during a postgrant review
proceeding is substantially larger than the pre-AIA reexamination
proceedings. While pre-AIA reexamination proceedings—and inter
partes review—limited the grounds that could be raised to questions
of novelty or nonobviousness on the basis of prior art consisting of
patents and printed publications,143 the new postgrant review allows
challenges to be made on any grounds “relating to invalidity of the
patent.”144 Therefore, challengers utilizing the new postgrant review
proceedings will be able to raise broad legal and policy issues
regarding all of the patentability requirements. Allowing the PTO
to decide all contours of patentability during the postgrant review
also supports the notion that Congress intended the agency to play
a larger policy-making function. Thus, the statutory language of the
AIA, including its expansion in statutory basis for challenging
patents, supports the conclusion that Congress viewed postgrant
review proceedings as a law-making vehicle by which the PTO could
announce patent law and policy determinations that affect the
rights of many and carry the force of law.
Up until this point, this Section has focused on developing a
theoretical framework for when a grant of formal adjudicatory authority satisfies the force-of-law requirement. Nevertheless, because
courts overwhelmingly interpret Mead as establishing the norm that
a congressional conferral of formal adjudicatory authority generally
to encompass inter partes review but only to include postgrant review.
142. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(d), 125 Stat. 284, 307 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 324(b)). This is true only for postgrant review. This additional language is not found in the
sections of the AIA directed at inter partes review.
143. See supra note 80.
144. AIA § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 306 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321(b)).
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satisfies the force-of-law requirement,145 a query into whether the
PTO should be an exception to this norm is fruitful. In answering
this question, it is important to note that although scholars have
amply criticized the Chevron and Mead decisions,146 these cases
articulated the legal framework that represents the current administrative law norms. As a result, patent exceptionalism to administrative law is justified only to the extent it is premised on the
specific context of the patent system and not solely on the rehashing
of arguments against the legal framework offered by Chevron and
its progeny.
The rest of this Section addresses context-specific counterarguments as to why the PTO should be an exception to the norm
that a grant of formal adjudicatory power carries with it interpretative authority. This Subsection concludes that conceivable
counterarguments—such as the so-called major question exception,
the fact that the PTO lacks robust substantive rule-making authority, and the existence of the Federal Circuit—are insufficient to
justify such a departure. As a result, this Subsection ultimately
concludes that the congressional conferral of formal adjudicatory
authority to the PTO satisfies the force-of-law requirement.
1. Too Big to Delegate
Perhaps the strongest argument against granting Chevron
deference to the PTO is the so-called major question exception to the
Chevron framework. Under this exception, courts deem certain
issues too significant to support an inference of congressional
delegation based on statutory ambiguity.147 In other words, courts,
145. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
146. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (calling Chevron “a siren’s song,
seductive but treacherous”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1, 68-81 (2000) (arguing that Chevron deference undermines the role of the
judiciary in our constitutional structure); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 445-46 (1989) (arguing that Chevron is based on the
legal fiction that ambiguity should be equated to delegation).
147. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (“In
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that
Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”).
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in “extraordinary cases,” have declined to uphold an implicit congressional delegation that satisfies the force-of-law directive,
especially when such a delegation would represent a substantial
change in the structure of an institutional system.148
At first blush, the too-big-to-delegate doctrine appears to lend
considerable support to denying Chevron deference to the PTO.
Because the Agency’s substantive interpretations of the Patent Act
are currently afforded no judicial deference,149 granting Chevron
deference to the PTO’s legal interpretations announced during
postgrant review proceedings would represent a substantial change
in the dynamics of the patent system.150 Identifying the primary
guardian of the patentability standards is likely a question of
paramount import. Thus, one could argue that if Congress wanted
the PTO to have interpretative authority, then it would have
signaled its intent explicitly. For example, Congress could have
specifically stated in the AIA that the PTO’s statutory interpretations of the Patent Act produced in postgrant review proceedings are
entitled to strong judicial deference.
However, a closer examination of the major question exception
suggests that its extension to the PTO context is suspect on at least
two grounds. First, the series of Supreme Court cases that are
frequently cited as applying the too-big-to-delegate doctrine do not
turn exclusively on this criterion. Importantly, in each of the cases
the Court performed a particularized analysis that gave substantial
weight to compounding or additional factors that were also present.
For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
Court held that a grant of substantive rule-making authority
coupled with ambiguity in the term “drug” in the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) was insufficient to infer that Congress
delegated to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jurisdiction
over tobacco products.151 Whereas the Court noted that the FDA had
“asserted jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a
significant portion of the American economy,”152 it gave substantial
148. See id. at 150.
149. See supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
150. See Wasserman, supra note 4, at 430 (noting that before the AIA, legal decisions by
the PTO were afforded no deference).
151. 529 U.S. at 125-26, 131-33.
152. Id. at 159.
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weight to the existence of six tobacco-specific statutes that were
enacted after the FDCA.153 The Court noted these subsequently
enacted statutes not only failed to grant the FDA jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products, but “[i]n adopting each statute, Congress
... acted against the backdrop of the FDA’s consistent and repeated
statements that it lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate
tobacco.”154
Similarly, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court found that a grant of
rule-making authority coupled with statutory ambiguity in the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) was insufficient to show that
Congress delegated interpretative authority to the Attorney General
to restrict the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted
suicide.155 While the Court noted the magnitude of the question at
stake—“Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide”156—the Court emphasized the existence of a number of
additional factors that weighed against an inference based on statutory ambiguity. For example, the Court stated that the language
of the statutory provision granting rule-making authority to the
Attorney General supported the delegation of a limited scope of
authority over the federal drug laws—that is, authority limited to
registration and marketing of controlled substances.157 The Court
further remarked that the structure of the CSA, which required the
Attorney General to obtain medical advice from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, as well as the Attorney General’s
overall lack of experience—both with the regulation of physicianassisted suicide and the restriction of controlled substances—also
negated such an inference.158 Thus, similar to Brown & Williamson,
the Court’s decision did not turn solely on the presence of a so-called
major question.
153. Id. at 140, 143-44.
154. Id. at 144.
155. 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006).
156. Id. at 249 (quoting Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)).
157. Id. at 259 (“The Attorney General is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
and to charge reasonable fees relating to the registration and control of the manufacture,
distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances and to listed chemicals.” (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 821 (2000 & Supp. V))).
158. Id. at 266 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S.
144, 153 (1991)).
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Importantly, none of the compounding or additional factors
discussed in Brown & Williamson or Gonzales are present in the
PTO context. No statutes were subsequently enacted, nor did any
institutional developments occur, that suggest Congress did not
intend to give the PTO primary authority over the interpretations
of the patentability requirements in the Patent Act. In fact, the sole
source of the PTO’s interpretative authority stems from a recently
enacted statute that provides the first major overhaul of the patent
system in over sixty years.159 Unlike the Attorney General, the PTO
has extensive historical familiarity with the patentability standards. The Agency makes close to 500,000 patentability decisions a
year, and thus, the PTO is faced with making difficult substantive
patent law determinations on a daily basis.160
Even assuming that the dispositive factor in Brown & Williamson
and Gonzales was that Congress did not intend to “alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes”161—Congress’s conferral of formal adjudicatory power to the
PTO is neither vague nor ancillary. First, because the AIA specifically states that postgrant review proceedings are to be utilized to
decide “novel or unsettled legal question[s] that [are] important to
other patents or patent applications,”162 it hardly seems that
anything was hidden in a mousehole. In contrast, Congress appears
to have explicitly recognized that the PTO’s postgrant review proceedings accompanied a grant of law-making power. Second, unlike
the implicit delegations at issue in Brown & Williamson—the
meaning of the word “drug” in the FDCA163—and Gonzales—the
meaning of the phrase “legitimate medical purpose” in the CSA164—
the postgrant review proceedings were a foundational aspect of the
recently enacted AIA. The PTO’s new and modified proceedings
159. See supra Part I.B, II.A.
160. See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2012, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified Mar. 19,
2013, 8:59 PM).
161. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
162. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(d), 125 Stat. 284, 307 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 324(b)). This is true only for postgrant review. This additional language is not found in the
sections of the AIA directed at inter partes review.
163. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
164. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
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occupied close to a quarter of the pages of the AIA165 and are also
accompanied by substantial legislative history discussing the
contours of the proceedings.166 Thus, the postgrant review proceedings are much more synonymous with elephants than they are with
mouseholes.167
Further, unlike the FDCA or the CSA, which were enacted well
before the Chevron decision, Congress conferred formal adjudicatory
authority to the PTO over eleven years after the Mead opinion.
When Congress enacted the AIA, a conferral of substantive rulemaking or formal adjudicatory authority was generally understood
as sufficient to support an inference of an agency’s ability to speak
with the force of law.
2. Is the Lack of Substantive Rule Making Fatal?
Even though it is abundantly clear that agencies that possess
both rule-making authority and formal adjudicatory powers can
choose to speak with the force of law primarily through case-by-case
adjudication,168 the PTO possesses only the latter.169 Moreover, the
AIA declined to grant the PTO the robust substantive rule-making
powers that had been proposed in earlier versions of the legislation.170 One could argue that the PTO’s lack of expansive rule165. AIA § 6, 125 Stat. at 299-313 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319, 321-329)
(directing fourteen out of the fifty-nine pages of the Act towards inter partes and postgrant
review).
166. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
167. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 58
(2012) (noting that the postgrant review proceeding for challenging patent validity is “a
primary feature” of the AIA).
168. Both the NLRB and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are known for heavily
relying on formal adjudication to make policy. For the NLRB, see, for example, Mark H.
Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 274
(1991) (“Despite having been granted both rulemaking and adjudicatory power in its statutory
charter more than half a century ago, the [NLRB] has chosen to formulate policy almost
exclusively through the process of adjudication.” (footnotes omitted)). For the FTC, see, for
example, Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
257, 263 (“Adjudication was the primary function of ... the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), and it was a substantial part of the business of the [FTC] as well.”).
169. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
170. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 11 (“In addition to the
authority conferred by other provisions of this title, the Director may promulgate such rules,
regulations, and orders that the Director determines appropriate to carry out the provisions
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making authority renders its legislative interpretations announced
during postgrant review proceedings ineligible for Chevron deference. The Court’s early Chevron jurisprudence left commentators
and lower courts split on this very issue.171 The Federal Circuit
weighed in on the debate in 1997, holding that substantive rulemaking powers were a prerequisite for an agency’s eligibility for
Chevron deference.172 Whereas the Federal Circuit’s decision may
have been justified in light of the Court’s jurisprudence at that
time,173 its reasoning is simply indefensible in light of subsequent
Court precedent—most noticeably Mead.
Nothing in the Mead opinion, or ensuing Supreme Court opinions,
supports the conclusion that only agencies with robust substantive
rule-making authority are eligible for Chevron deference. In fact the
Mead Court stated the exact opposite:
We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.
It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement
of such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases
applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of noticeand-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.174
of this title or any other law applicable to the United States Patent and Trademark Office or
that the Director determines necessary to govern the operation and organization of the
Office.”).
171. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 31, at 849 & n.83 (noting that courts were divided
initially on whether agencies that lack legislative rule making are eligible for Chevron
deference).
172. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that only
agencies with legislative rule-making authority may be eligible for Chevron deference); see
also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 31, at 849 n.83 (noting that the Federal Circuit has held
“that [only] agencies without rulemaking authority are ineligible for Chevron deference”).
173. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 14, at 299 n.157 (“The Federal Circuit had held
earlier [in Merck] (consistent with Supreme Court precedent) that because the PTO did not
have substantive rulemaking authority, Chevron deference did not apply to PTO
regulations.”).
174. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted).
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Moreover, the Court’s justification as to why formal procedures
are generally sufficient to infer a delegation—that such procedures
“foster ... fairness and deliberation”175—arguably supports the conclusion that a grant of formal adjudication is just as likely as a
grant of rule-making authority to satisfy the force-of-law requirement. At a minimum, the APA requirements of the trial procedures
for formal adjudication foster as much transparency and normative values of accountability as the procedures that govern rule
making.176 Moreover, from a theoretical viewpoint, the trial-like
protections that formal adjudication requires replicate many of the
aspects of the judicial process more generally.177 To the extent that
society accepts that courts make binding law on a case-by-case basis
because of the relative transparency and procedural protections of
the judicial process, then the same should hold for formal adjudication.178 This is not to say that the Court’s emphasis on procedure has
been universally praised.179 However, critiques of the Court’s
procedure-based deference paradigm are directed at the general
framework of Chevron, and they fail to provide a sufficient justification as to why the PTO should be treated as an exception.180
175. Id. at 230.
176. See Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 129, at 520.
177. See supra notes 101-11, 120 and accompanying text.
178. Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 129, at 520.
179. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 204 (discussing the costs of focusing too much on APA procedures in
determining whether Chevron deference applies).
180. Additionally, one could conceivably argue that certain structural aspects of the
postgrant review proceedings suggest that Congress did not intend the PTO to speak with the
force of law. Although this Article has argued that the enlarged basis for challenging a patent
during a postgrant review proceeding supports a contention that Congress intended the
Agency to be the primary interpreter of the Patent Act, one may posit that the time
limitations associated with the new adjudicatory proceeding—a third party can only challenge
an already-granted patent within nine months of its issuance—suggest the opposite. AIA,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(d), 125 Stat. 284, 306 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321(b)).
However, this time limitation is for postgrant review only, not inter partes review. Although
it seems likely the Agency would be able to shape all aspects of substantive patent law
standards during postgrant review, it is possible that certain strands of the patentability
requirements, such as the enablement of after-arising technology, may elude PTO review
within this nine-month window. See generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Enable After-Arising
Technology, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009). Nevertheless, such time limits are ubiquitous
in formal adjudicatory settings, especially within agencies that process applications or
permits. For example, initial supplemental security income determinations made by the Social
Security Administration can only be challenged in a formal adjudicatory proceeding within
a specific time period. Understanding Supplemental Social Security Income: Appeals Process,
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3. Creation of the Federal Circuit
Another possible argument against the application of general
administrative law norms to the PTO is the creation of the Federal
Circuit in 1982 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA).181
The Federal Circuit’s formation was driven largely by concerns over
circuit courts arriving at inconsistent decisions about invalidity and
infringement, which thus encouraged rampant forum shopping
among them.182 Congress gave the Federal Circuit virtually exclusive jurisdiction over all patent appeals, creating a specialized
court for reviewing patent decisions in order to bring more uniformity to the law.183
At least two arguments exist for why the existence of the Federal
Circuit casts doubt on granting Chevron deference to the PTO’s
validity determinations. First, the Federal Circuit is an expert
court, and expertise is at least one of the animating principles of the
Chevron opinion for granting strong judicial deference to an agency’s
legal interpretations.184 To the extent the Federal Circuit possesses
sufficient proficiency in patent law or innovation policy, the normative justification for applying the Chevron framework to the PTO is
diminished. Second, one could argue that the FCIA signaled congressional intent for the Federal Circuit to be the primary interpreter of the Patent Act and that explicit delegation overcomes the
later-enacted AIA’s implicit delegation of interpretative authority
U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (2013), http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-appeals-ussi.htm (noting that
appeals must be filed within 60 days of the initial determination). Although the Social
Security Administration possesses rule-making authority that allows the Agency to partake
in law making over an arguably larger range of issues, for many years the Agency made law
primarily through case-by-case adjudication. Thus, it seems unlikely that Congress intended
the time limits associated with postgrant review to suggest the PTO lacked force-of-law
authority.
181. Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
182. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (noting that “undue forum-shopping and unsettling
inconsistency in adjudications” resulted from having patent cases appealed to the regional
appellate courts).
183. The recent AIA further solidifies the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over patent appeals
by repealing the Supreme Court decision in Homes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002), which held that a patent law counterclaim does
not serve as the basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction because the well-pleaded-complaint rule
governs. AIA § 19, 125 Stat. at 331-33 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2006)).
184. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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to the PTO.185 Although the AIA was enacted after the FCIA, the
FCIA can arguably be read as specifically speaking to who should
be the primary interpreter of the patentability standards,186 and
thus it could affect the interpretation of the AIA. However, upon
closer inspection, a number of reasons exist as to why altering the
application of basic administrative law principles based solely on
the existence of the Federal Circuit is misguided.
First, in its seminal decision Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme
Court largely rejected the notion that the application of administrative law norms to the PTO should be modified due to the Federal
Circuit’s expertise.187 In Zurko, the Court held that the APA provided the proper standard for reviewing the PTO’s factual determinations, reversing the Federal Circuit’s view that a less deferential
standard of “clearly erroneous” governed.188 The Court went on to
reprimand the Federal Circuit for its endorsement of patent law
exceptionalism, stating that “[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity,” and that unjustified departures from administrative law norms frustrated this very
purpose.189 Although the Court acknowledged the expertise of the
Federal Circuit, it nevertheless rejected the notion that such
expertise justified a departure from current administrative law
principles.190
Second, although the FCIA signaled congressional intent for the
Federal Circuit to be the primary interpreter of the Patent Act,
several reasons support being wary of the idea that this explicit
delegation trumps a subsequent implicit delegation of interpretative
authority to the PTO. To begin, nothing in Chevron or its progeny
support the claim that if Congress wants the PTO’s legal decisions
to receive Chevron deference, it must explicitly state as much. In
fact, as discussed above, requiring explicit delegations is counter to
185. The Supreme Court has established that “the meaning of one statute may be affected
by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to
the topic at hand.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
186. See Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 583-84 (2003) (discussing the purposes of the FCIA).
187. 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 155.
190. Id. at 163-65 (stating that its judges will properly review PTO fact-finding “through
the lens of patent-related experience” because “the Federal Circuit is a specialized court”).
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the very heart of Chevron—the innovative aspect of which was the
extension of strong judicial deference to implicit delegations.191
Moreover, this argument must be rejected to the extent that it is
based on the premise that Congress does not intend to delegate
interpretative authority to an agency every time it confers formal
adjudicatory authority. Even though commentators have lamented
that the Chevron framework is largely based on a legal fiction, this
critique is not specific to the PTO but takes aim at the Court’s
deference paradigm more generally.192 It is also highly unlikely that
Congress “unambiguously expressed intent” in the FCIA to subsequently prevent strong deference to the PTO, as Congress enacted
the FCIA two years before the Supreme Court announced the legal
framework of Chevron, a decision that greatly expanded the instances in which courts owed agencies strong judicial deference.193
Importantly, the underlying goal of the FCIA, to bring uniformity
to patent law,194 will not be disturbed by granting Chevron deference
to the PTO’s interpretations of ambiguous terms of the Patent Act.
Because the PTO’s legal determinations announced during postgrant review proceedings will carry the force of law, the Agency, just
like the Federal Circuit did before, will be announcing substantive
patent law standards that govern the entire nation. Moreover, a
uniform body of patentability standards will be developed regardless
of whether the courts or the Agency decide an unsettled legal question first. However, that body of law is more likely to be announced
by the PTO than the courts. To help illustrate why, imagine that the
issue of whether genes constitute patentable subject matter is
unsettled. If the PTO decides this legal issue in a postgrant review
proceeding before a district court is faced with such a decision, the
191. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 31, at 193-99 (arguing that the APA supports the notion
that Congress likely intended courts to exercise independent judgment on interpretative
questions); Farina, supra note 146, at 471 (arguing that Congress’s use of “equally expansive
language in statutory schemes committed to judicial oversight ... seem[s] to undermine any
notion” that agencies are preferred over courts to “interpret[ ] broad statutory mandates”). But
see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation,
97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2034-39 (2011) (marshalling evidence that calls into question whether
Congress thinks about the delegation of interpretative authority when it writes statutes).
Notably, most critiques take aim at inferring implicit delegations based on statutory
ambiguity, not implicit delegations based on conferrals of formal adjudication or rule making.
193. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
194. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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Federal Circuit will likely uphold the Agency’s decision under
Chevron deference.195 A district court that is later faced with the
issue of whether genes constitute patentable subject matter will be
bound by the Federal Circuit decision, as will later Federal Circuit
panels. The PTO’s viewpoint, assuming it conflicts with the lower
court’s decision, is still likely to prevail even if a district court
decides the issue first and the Federal Circuit upholds the lower
court decision. The Federal Circuit, under National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, is obligated
to uphold the PTO’s interpretation of an ambiguous term even in
the face of contrary judicial precedent.196 As a result, granting the
PTO primary interpretative authority over the core patentability
standards will result in a uniform standard that governs the entire
nation—the standard, however, is likely to be the one announced by
the PTO, not the Federal Circuit.
Finally, it should be noted that although the PTO’s role in
crafting substantive patent law would be greatly elevated in this
new paradigm, the Federal Circuit would continue to play a critical
role in the development of patent law in at least three ways. First,
the Federal Circuit would review the fruits of the PTO’s postgrant
review proceedings. In this role, the appellate court would continue
to shape substantive patent law by determining both whether the
relevant language of the Patent Act was ambiguous and, if so,
whether the PTO’s interpretation of that language was reasonable.
Second, the court would also continue to play a significant role interpreting patent law during validity disputes and review of patent
denials, although that role would be more circumscribed than it is
presently. If, for example, litigants raise an issue that had been
directly addressed by the PTO during a postgrant review proceeding and that interpretation had been upheld by the Federal
Circuit, the appellate court would apply the PTO’s determination
without further interpretation. However, if a party raises a challenge to the validity of a patent that implicates an ambiguity in the
PTO’s interpretation or raises a question of first impression, the
Federal Circuit would continue to decide in the first instance what
195. The Patent Act is ambiguous with respect to whether genes should be patentable, and
the Agency’s decision is likely to be reasonable. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit will uphold
the PTO’s decision regarding the patentability of genes.
196. 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005).
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the appropriate legal standard should be.197 Third, the Federal
Circuit would remain the primary interpreter of the sections of the
Patent Act that are directed towards infringement and damages—
standards the PTO would not address during a validity determination.
In sum, because Congress intended the postgrant review proceedings to be effectuated through formal adjudications and the
ordinary principles of administrative law apply to the PTO, the
Chevron step zero inquiry has been satisfied. Thus, the PTO’s reasonable legislative interpretation of ambiguous terms of the Patent
Act announced during postgrant review proceedings should be
afforded Chevron deference.
C. Rejecting the Dominant Chevron Approach
Up to this point, this Section has not taken a position on which,
if any, is the most desirable of the three approaches adopted by
courts in determining the triggering provision of formal procedures.
This Section addresses this normative question and provides a
strong theoretical basis for rejecting the dominant Chevron approach. Imagine that the Federal Circuit applies Chevron deference
to the PTO’s decision, that the word “hearing” in the AIA requires
the postgrant review proceedings to be effectuated through formal
adjudication, and that it finds that a congressional conferral of
formal adjudicatory powers is sufficient to satisfy the force-of-law
requirement. The implication would be that the appellate court
would give Chevron deference to the PTO’s decision on whether its
interpretations of the Patent Act should get Chevron deference. This
piggybacking of Chevron appears to be in direct conflict with the
Court’s repeated statements that the applicability of the Chevron
framework turns on the intent of Congress.198 Although the adoption
of formal procedures would not be without cost to the Agency—the
administrative burden and the financial resources used by formal
adjudications are substantially more than their informal counterparts199—the potential payoff for adopting formal adjudicatory
197. See Dreyfuss, supra note 24, at 1-4.
198. See supra Part I.A.
199. See Berry, supra note 54, at 544 (highlighting the agency preference for “procedural
efficiency” over “procedural formality,” and that, “[g]iven the opportunity, agencies will
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procedures—the possibility of obtaining Chevron deference for its
legal interpretations of ambiguous terms in the Patent Act200—is
substantial. As a result, the PTO will likely sacrifice the flexibility
associated with informal procedures in an attempt to garner the
ability to speak with the force of law. Because the decision of
whether an agency’s own legal decisions should be entitled to
Chevron deference is so conspicuously draped in self-interest, it
seems almost unfathomable that Congress intended to delegate such
authority to an agency.201 Thus, this Article provides a compelling
theoretical foundation for rejecting the Chevron approach to
deciding the triggering provision of formal adjudications when, at
least, the agency in question, like the PTO, did not previously
possess the ability to speak with the force of law.202
usually choose informal procedures over formal ones”).
200. See supra Part II.A.
201. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 31, at 910-11 (“[I]t has never been maintained that
Congress would want courts to give Chevron deference to an agency’s determination that it
is entitled to Chevron deference.”). This is especially true in light of the fact that the PTO has
shown a growing interest in elevating its role in the market for patent law, see Long, supra
note 4, at 1966 (“For a while now, the PTO has been vying to gain more influence in the
market for supplying legal rules and norms.”), including by seeking substantive rule-making
authority, Letter from Gary Locke, Sec’y of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Senator
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary and Senator Jeffrey B. Sessions, III,
Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.
judiciary.senate.gov/resources/documents/111Documents.cfm.
Moreover, courts have refused to apply deference to agency interpretations of statutory
provisions that establish the right of judicial review largely out of concerns of agency selfinterest—that agencies might be inclined to shelter their decisions from judicial review. See
Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478-80 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (noting that Chevron does not apply to the provisions of a statute establishing rights
of judicial review); see also LAWSON, supra note 47, at 464 (suggesting that it is unlikely that
a court would give Chevron deference to agency interpretations of provisions providing for
judicial review).
202. Interestingly, several scholars have argued that implied delegation and agency selfinterest weigh against the application of Chevron to determine the triggering provisions of
formal procedures. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 54, at 582-83; William S. Jordan, III, Chevron
and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 282-321 (2009);
John F. Stanley, Note, The “Magic Words” of § 554: A New Test for Formal Adjudication
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1090 (2005) (arguing that
Skidmore deference should be applied to an agency’s interpretation of “hearing” in § 554(a)).
These scholars have been primarily occupied with the troubling observation that given a
choice, agencies almost unilaterally elect informal over formal procedures, and thus, agencies
sacrifice fairness and legitimacy in order to escape the burden and expense associated with
formal adjudications. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 54, at 544. By failing to consider the
implications for an agency, like the PTO, which lacks substantive rule-making procedures for
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III. NORMATIVE CASE FOR DEFERENCE: COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
This Article has thus far predominantly focused on the analytical
question of how existing administrative law principles should apply
to the judicial review of the PTO’s legal interpretations. The previous Part showed first that Congress intended the PTO’s postgrant
review proceedings to be effectuated through formal adjudication,
and second, that this grant of formal adjudicatory power was
accompanied by the ability to speak with the force of law. Although
this descriptive and analytical account is sufficient to guide courts,
it does not address the normative question of how the institutional
relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit should be
structured. This Part begins this normative inquiry, taking as its
baseline the principal goal of the patent system—the promotion of
innovation.203 To guide this analysis, I draw on the large and
growing body of literature on the topic of comparative institutional
analysis.204 This Part does not purport to elucidate the ideal institutional arrangement between courts and agencies. Instead, the
following discussion compares the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Federal Circuit and the PTO with respect to the two
canonical institutional design considerations: expertise and avoidance of capture or bias.
A. Expertise
Scholars generally accept that the standards of patentability are
fundamentally policy questions that need to be decided on the basis

electing more formal procedures, the current scholarship has largely overlooked an even more
salient reason for why the Chevron approach should not be applied to determine whether
provisions of formal procedures are triggered: the ability of an agency to adopt formal
procedures and then assert that its legal determinations are entitled to Chevron deference.
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
204. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-67 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003).
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of sound economic and technological insight.205 For example,
consider patentable subject matter, which delineates the types of
inventions that may be subject to patent protection. Section 101 of
the Patent Act is quite broad, setting forth the subject matter that
can be patented as “process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or
composition[s] of matter.”206 Early on, the Supreme Court carved out
abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature from patent
eligible subject matter. As the Supreme Court explained, these
principles represent “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work,”207 and they are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men[,] ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”208 Thus,
decisions on whether new inventions, such as genes, which may or
may not fall within an exception, should be patent eligible are
largely being driven by policy concerns of whether social welfare is
enhanced or decreased by extending patents to these inventions.
As a result, there is near-universal agreement that the institution
charged with creating sound patent policy needs access both to
economic and to technological data, as well as sufficient expertise to
analyze and interpret this information.209 Although one of the hallmarks of the comparative institutional literature is that agencies
possess superior information-gathering procedures and technical
expertise than courts,210 the specialization of the Federal Circuit
casts doubt on whether this norm should extend to the patent
system. In fact, a number of scholars have argued that the Federal
Circuit is the best institution to develop patent policy, in part
because of the court’s expertise.211 Even taking into consideration
the Federal Circuit’s specialization, this Section concludes that the
PTO is more likely than the appellate court to possess the prerequi-

205. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 7, at 1037.
206. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
207. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
208. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
209. Burstein, supra note 5, at 1777-78 (“Patent policy in particular requires the
application of technological and economic analysis to a set of legal tools ... set forth in the
patent statute.”); Rai, supra note 14, at 1262 (“[E]xpertise in both economics and technology
is a highly desirable attribute for any institution creating patent policy.”).
210. See Jaffe, supra note 1, at 324; Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2079.
211. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 6, at 106-07 (arguing that the Federal Circuit
should more actively tailor patent law to take into account differences in technological
innovation).
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site characteristics necessary to adjust the patentability standards
towards an optimal innovation level.
To begin, the PTO, in general, enjoys superior mechanisms of
gathering information necessary to make informed patent policy
decisions. The agency conducts hearings,212 partakes in research
studies,213 and works closely with other expert federal agencies.214
The PTO also engages in rule-making procedures, even when it is
not legally obligated to do so, that are specifically designed to
encourage interested parties to communicate relevant viewpoints
and information to the Agency.215 The PTO could expand this host
of information-gathering techniques and rely upon them more heavily to collect the technological and economic data necessary to craft
substantive patent law standards that promote innovation.
By contrast, like all appellate courts, the Federal Circuit is largely confined to the record developed by interested parties.216 While it
is true that litigants present expert witnesses that provide courts
with scientific and technical information that may be critical to their
decisional process, it is generally thought that these witnesses are
biased towards their retaining party. The result is that in almost
every case, the decision maker sees a “battle of the experts,” which
likely diminishes the value of information garnered from such
witnesses.217 Moreover, it seems unlikely that individual parties,
212. The PTO has held public hearings on issues as diverse as the identification of prior
art during the examination of a patent application, software patents, biotechnology, the
twenty-year patent term, and provisional applications. Public Hearings, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/index.html (last modified
Aug. 1, 2007, 8:15 PM).
213. The PTO is studying a host of patent-policy issues as part of its fulfillment of its AIA
requirements, including international protection for small businesses, prior-user rights,
genetic testing, effects of first-to-file on small businesses, patent litigation, misconduct before
the Office, satellite offices, virtual marking, and the implementation of the AIA. AIA Studies
and Reports, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/aia_
studies_reports.jsp (last modified Jan. 4, 2013, 3:42 PM).
214. Rai, supra note 14, at 1249-62 (delineating the role of agency actors other than the
PTO in shaping substantive patent law).
215. See, e.g., Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112,
¶1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001).
216. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking:
A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1986).
217. Cf. Adam Liptak, From One Footnote, a Debate over the Tangles of Law, Science and
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at A16 (“The legal system and the scientific method ... coexist in a way that is really hard on truth.” (quoting Professor William R. Freudenburg)).

2010

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1959

with arguably narrow interests in upholding or invalidating a
patent, will even provide the court with the type of information
necessary to make informed policy decisions, such as data on how
broader or narrower patentability standards affect social welfare.218
Although courts have some ad hoc mechanisms to increase their
access to information, these approaches are poor substitutes for the
information-gathering powers of agencies.219 For example, while the
Federal Circuit routinely considers amicus curiae briefs, the appellate court is still dependent on the amici submitting the right information necessary to adjust the standards of patentability to promote
innovation. If such information is not submitted, the Federal Circuit
cannot, unlike the PTO, order its own fact findings to make up for
the deficiency.220
However, even assuming that the Federal Circuit had the same
access to technological and economic data as the PTO, little reason
exists to believe its ability to analyze and understand this information is superior to that of the PTO. Only a handful of the Federal
Circuit judges hold scientific degrees.221 Even considering that the
majority of law clerks have a scientific background, the court’s technical expertise is still quite limited. By contrast, the PTO employs
close to 7000 patent examiners, all of whom have been scientifically
trained.222 In fact, many of the patent examiners hold advanced
scientific degrees in the precise areas in which they work.223
Although patent examiners may not on a day-to-day basis partici218. Kevin Emerson Collins, Even More Complex After All These Years: What the
Complexity of the “How?” Question of Tailoring Claim Scope Has to Say About the “Who?”
Question, 1 IP THEORY 35, 39 (2010).
219. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 5, at 1786-87.
220. Id. at 1787.
221. Judge Newman and Judge Lourie hold Ph.D.s in chemistry, Judges, U.S. CT. OF
APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Mar. 31, 2013),
Judge Moore holds an M.S. in science, Kimberly A. Moore, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS
FOR THE FED. CIR., http://cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kimberly-a-moore-circuit-judge.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013), and Judge Linn holds a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering,
Richard Linn, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://cafc.uscourts.
gov/judges/richard-linn-circuit-judge.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
222. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 10 (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/
USPTOFY2011PAR.pdf (noting that at the end of the fiscal year of 2011, the PTO employed
6780 patent examiners).
223. Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2003, 7:21 AM).

2013]

THE CHANGING GUARD OF PATENT LAW

2011

pate in the development of guidelines or other documents that
represent the PTO’s viewpoint on patent policy, they are at the
disposal of the Agency when needed.224
The Federal Circuit fares even worse when its economic proficiency is considered. None of the Federal Circuit judges or their
technical personnel are trained in economics.225 Thus, even if economic data was provided to the court through some means, the
judges are highly unlikely to be able to evaluate the merits of such
studies. They will not, for example, be able to determine methodological shortcomings of the empirical investigations, such as selection effects or data-gathering bias. Nor are they likely to be able to
fully appreciate the limitations on the conclusions that can be made
from these studies—that is, whether the study demonstrates only
a correlation or whether casual inferences may be drawn.
Further, even though the court’s jurisprudence has been routinely
criticized for being formalistic and failing to consider policy,226 the
court has shown little interest in developing an innovation policy expertise.227 The appellate court’s hesitancy to embrace an
explicit policy-making function is, in some ways, understandable.
Unequivocal policy pronouncements are somewhat antithetical to
judicial decision-making norms. Yet, at the same time, it is difficult
to understand the court’s role, especially when deciding the meaning
of an ambiguous term of the Patent Act, as not involving a policy
determination. As noted earlier, the heart of the gene-patent debate
is whether society would be better off with or without patents on
genes.
Notably, in contrast to courts, agencies are expressly charged
with making policy and weighing the costs and benefits of compet224. Thus, the group of policy experts at the PTO has continuous access to a vast wealth
of scientific expertise to help elucidate the underlying technological issues animating the
policy decision at hand.
225. See, e.g., supra note 221.
226. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 7, at 1103-10; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773-75 (2003).
227. Many of its judges flatly refute that the Federal Circuit engages in any sort of policy
making. Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us
About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397, 398 & n.6 (2011) (“[Federal Circuit]
judges insist that they do not ‘make policy’ but instead decide disputes between parties.”);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and
Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 803 & n.70 (2010).

2012

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1959

ing outcomes. Such explicit authority enables agencies to more fully
embrace a policy-making role of making discretionary judgments
based on a range of competing options. Even with such intellectual
freedom, the PTO has historically lacked robust economic expertise
that is needed to make informed policy decisions.228 Unlike other
agencies that specialize in technological innovation, the PTO has
never employed a large number of policy-oriented thinkers or economists. Importantly, the Agency has recently made strides to rectify
this shortcoming. In 2010 the PTO created an Office of the Chief
Economist.229 This Office had an immediate impact on the Agency’s
decision making.230 Although ample room still exists to improve the
PTO’s personnel and infrastructure so that the Agency can make
sound economic judgments, the creation of the Office of the Chief
Economist represents an important victory—a recognition by the
PTO and the executive branch of the import of expertise in innovation policy in patent law decision making.
Moreover, the enactment of the AIA makes future reforms to the
PTO considerably more likely.231 Perhaps most significantly, the
AIA granted the PTO fee-setting authority, which enables the
chronically underfunded Agency to raise revenue to support a robust
innovation policy group.232 Thus, although the PTO’s current structure is not optimal for promoting innovation policy by tailoring
patentability standards, the Agency has the potential to change into
one that does. In contrast, little hope exists that the Federal Circuit
will ever possess the requisite expertise or institutional design
needed to achieve the underlying goals of the patent system.

228. Rai, supra note 7, at 1132-33.
229. Office of Chief Economist, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/ip/
officechiefecon (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
230. For example, the PTO’s recent rules regarding its fees were based on economic
modeling. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DETAILED APPENDICES: PATENT FEE PROPOSAL
(2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fee_setting_-_ppac_hearing_
appendices_7feb12.pdf.
231. AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316-20 (2011) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 35 U.S.C.).
232. Id. The AIA also mandates that the PTO take into account explicit policy concerns
—for example, “national economy or national competitiveness”—when prioritizing
examinations for important technologies. Id. § 25, 125 Stat. at 337-38. The Agency will almost
necessarily need to expand its policy-making apparatus to the extent it is going to properly
effectuate the new statute.
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B. Capture and Institutional Bias
Even though expertise may give rise to distinctive advantages
with respect to institutional competence, specialization has an
associated drawback—the potential of “capture.” An institution’s
repeated interaction with particular groups holding narrow interests may result in at least two pathologies. First, an institution may
develop “tunnel vision,” pursuing its own technocratic worldview
without sufficient regard for larger normative concerns.233 Second,
a narrow set of rights holders may directly capture an institution’s
viewpoints. The latter concern stems from the logic that concentrated, well-financed groups are more likely than diffuse, less organized entities to influence decision makers.234 The result in either
situation is that the institution will systematically make decisions
that favor the interest of a narrow set of constituencies over those
of the general public.
The concerns associated with capture theory are most frequently
attributed to agencies that have repeated interactions with their
regulatory constituents that could lead to distortions in agency
decision making. More recently, scholars astutely observed that the
adjudicative process is also susceptible to the influence of interest
groups and expanded the applications of the theory to the judiciary
as well.235 Of course, beyond capture concerns, other institutional
structures may exist that also systematically bias the organization’s
decision making. Although these influences may not be directly
related to expertise, any bias in an institution’s decisional process
is concerning—whether the institution is a court or an agency.
Like many agencies, the PTO is not immune from charges of
capture or institutional bias. The Agency has traditionally been
233. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 11-19 (1993).
234. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 53-57, 132-34 (1971); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 32 (1991).
235. Elhauge, supra note 234, at 67-68 (“[T]he same interest groups that have an
organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence legislators and agencies
generally also have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence the
courts.”); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974) (noting that repeat players have
advantages over parties that utilize the judiciary less frequently).
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structured to favor patent grants. My previous work has shown that
the PTO’s historical fee structure likely biased the PTO towards
issuing patents because the Agency garnered over half of its patent
operating budget through fees it could collect only if it granted patents.236 Moreover, widespread agreement among scholars exists that
the historical examiner compensation system favored allowance.237
Notably, all that is being asked of the PTO is to grant patents. The
patent prosecution process occurs ex parte; no third party is present
to argue that a patent should not be issued. These constant one-way
demands to issue patents raise concerns that the Agency may
develop tunnel vision. In fact, the Agency’s past rhetoric that its
mission includes “help[ing] customers get patents” reveals a culture
that appears to be unduly influenced by the interests of patentees.238
However, the PTO has made strides to overcome this pathology.
The Agency recently revamped its examiner compensation system,
among other things, to diminish incentives to grant patents.239
Recent empirical work by Mark Lemley and Bhaven Sampat finds
a correlation between the length of patent examiner experience and
an examiner’s propensity to grant a patent, and suggests that the
incentives facing examiners are much more complicated than they
were typically perceived.240
The passage of the AIA should further help alleviate some concerns of capture or bias. Because Congress granted the PTO feesetting authority, the Agency has taken steps, at least to some
extent, to decrease its reliance on patent issuance fees.241 The
236. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV.
67 (2013)
237. See, e.g., Long, supra note 4, at 1990-91 (“Internal PTO practices create a bias in favor
of granting patents.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577, 607 (1999) (“Consequently, the only way to earn bonus points with confidence is to allow
a patent application.”).
238. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Patent Business, in CORPORATE PLAN—2001, at
23 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/pt04.pdf.
239. Wasserman, supra note 4, at 419 & n.150.
240. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817 (2012) (finding that more-experienced examiners are
more likely to grant patents than less-experienced examiners).
241. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ATTACHMENT 1: TABLE OF PATENT FEE CHANGES
2 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fee_setting_-
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enactment of robust postgrant review proceedings should broaden
the Agency’s perspective, as the PTO will now routinely interact
with constituents that are arguing to narrow the scope of patent
law. Additionally, the low-cost design of the postgrant review proceedings will hopefully enable substantial participation from public
interest groups, whose primary focus is the protection of the public
domain.242 The result should be increased awareness, promoting
innovation not only by granting patent but also by protecting the
public domain. Nevertheless, like all agencies, capture remains a
point of concern with the PTO.
Agency capture, however, represents a substantial objection to
extending Chevron deference to the PTO only to the extent that the
judicial alternative is superior. The specialization of the Federal
Circuit has led some commentators to suggest that the appellate
court is prone to the same institutional pathologies of tunnel vision
and bias of which they have accused the PTO.243 The Federal Circuit
hears disproportionately from the patent bar and has increasingly
begun to draw its technical staff—most notably its clerks—from
patent law firms.244 Although intellectual property law firms represent both plaintiffs and defendants in patent litigation, they are
generally likely to benefit from broad patent rights, especially with
respect to patentable subject matter.245 As Arti Rai recently noted,
empirical data on amicus briefs supports this contention: patent bar
associations file amicus briefs in favor of patentees at a significantly
_ppac_hearing_attachment_1-table_of_patent_fee_changes_7feb12.pdf (stating that the PTO’s
new fee schedule decreases issuance fees by 53 percent). Notably, the new fee structure
increases renewal fees. Empirical studies are needed to determine the extent to which the
new fee structure creates any distortions in the agency’s decision making, including a
granting bias.
242. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (describing the postgrant review
proceedings “as providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation”).
243. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 37, at 1608 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has the disadvantage
of having been structured from the beginning to meet the needs of patent interest groups.”);
Rai, supra note 7, at 1110 (discussing tunnel vision in the Federal Circuit); see also Dreyfuss,
supra note 24, at 3 (“[J]udges ... are susceptible to ‘capture’ by the bar that regularly practices
before them.”); Long, supra note 4, at 1971 (“Judges in specialized courts may come to identify
a little too closely with the areas of law in which they specialize.”).
244. In contrast to fifteen years ago, I have seen that the Federal Circuit now hires the
overwhelming majority of its clerks from law firms rather than from law schools.
245. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 14, at 1271 (“Although patent lawyers may represent both
plaintiffs and defendants in cases, associations of patent lawyers are often perceived as being
quite pro-patentee.”); Rai, supra note 7, at 1110 & n.340.
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higher rate than the government or high-tech companies.246 More
directly, the court’s patent law jurisprudence has exhibited some
symptoms that are consistent with bias. Several commentators have
noted that Federal Circuit precedent has trended towards strengthening patent rights.247 Empirical evidence also suggests that the
Federal Circuit has propatentee tendencies.248 The Supreme Court’s
renewed interest in the development of substantive patent law and
its repeated reversal of Federal Circuit jurisprudence is also
suggestive of tunnel vision.249 Definitively proving capture of an
agency or a court is difficult, if not impossible. Some scholars have
certainly taken issue with the notion that the patent bar has
captured the Federal Circuit.250 Nevertheless, the possibility that
the Federal Circuit’s decision-making process is unduly influenced
by factions, at the very least, gives pause to dismissing the concept
of the PTO playing a larger role in patent policy based on agency
capture alone.251
246. See Chien, supra note 227, at 423-24 nn.155-56 (noting that Bar/IP associations file
in support of patentees 55 percent of the time, whereas high-tech companies file in support
of the patentee only 5 percent of the time, and the government files in support of the patentee
only 28 percent of the time).
247. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 789 (“[O]bservers of the patent system have voiced
increasingly vociferous complaints about the state of patent jurisprudence, and by extension
about the Federal Circuit.”).
248. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 104-06 (2004) (noting that the Federal Circuit is significantly more likely to find
patents valid and infringed upon than were its predecessors, the regional appellate courts);
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998) (noting that the overall rate of district courts determining
validity in a manner favorable to patentees is higher after the creation of the Federal Circuit
than it was before).
249. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 227, at 792-93 (chronicling the Supreme Court’s
reversal of the Federal Circuit).
250. See, e.g., John Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 683 (2009) (“[T]he notion
that the Federal Circuit may be systematically promoting pro-patent or pro-litigation policy
because of its intellectual capture by the patent bar seems substantially implausible.”); Rai,
supra note 7, at 1110-14.
251. Finally, little reason exists to believe that the PTO is more prone to capture than
other federal agencies that have long enjoyed substantial powers to craft policy and make law.
At least with the patent system, the two most influential and well-organized constituents tend
to hold divergent viewpoints on many of the significant issues in patent law. See Long, supra
note 4, at 1992-93 (“[T]he major interest groups with something at stake in patent law—the
pharmaceutical industry and the software industry—have generally proven to be well-
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Beyond concerns of capture or of an institutional bias to allow
patents, granting the PTO primary interpretive authority over the
core patentability standards may give rise to a fear that the
Agency’s policy decisions will be overly influenced by its production
function—that is, its growing backlog of unreviewed patent applications.252 Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy have noted that
“PTO officials might become too focused on the agency’s own workload problems” to fully account for the nuances of the policy issues
at stake.253 As a result, Abramowicz and Duffy conclude that the
Agency may favor bright line rules that can be quickly applied in an
effort to speed up the processing of patent applications but may also
prevent the fine tuning needed to optimize innovation policy.254
Again, however, a concern that the PTO may be overly concerned
with the administration of substantive patent law represents a significant opposition to extending Chevron deference to the Agency
only to the extent this pathology is absent in Federal Circuit decision making. The appellate court, however, has also been charged
with favoring bright line, formulistic rules that may be oversimplifying the policy interests at stake in the development of substantive
patent law. Numerous scholars have noted the Federal Circuit’s
penchant for easy-to-apply rules.255 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
pattern of repeatedly overturning the Federal Circuit’s bright line
rules, while concurrently emphasizing the need for more flexible
standards, provides further evidence that the appellate court may
be giving too much weight to the administration of its pronouncements.256 Thus, concerns that the Agency’s substantive law determiorganized and balanced on opposite sides of many key issues in patent law and policy.”).
252. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 222, at 23 fig. 8 (noting the PTO
currently has a backlog of 660,000 patent applications awaiting substantive review).
253. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1541, 1561-62 (2009).
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 795-96 (noting that Federal Circuit jurisprudence
displays an overconcern for precision at the expense of accuracy); Rai, supra note 7, at 1115
(noting that “there can be no serious dispute that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is
formalist in its orientation”); Thomas, supra note 226, at 774 (noting that the Federal Circuit
patent jurisprudence “runs a common thread: the drift toward simple rules”).
256. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
machine-or-transformation test for patentable subject matter and adopting a more flexible
approach), rev’g 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid teaching-suggestion-motivation test for
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nations may be influenced by its production function alone do not
appear to represent a significant obstacle to granting the PTO
Chevron deference.
In sum, the PTO possesses superior pathways to acquire technological and economic data, as well as the expertise to evaluate and
analyze this information to craft substantive patent law standards
to promote innovation. Even though neither the Federal Circuit nor
the PTO has historically shown strength in policy making, the PTO
has recently made significant strides to correct this deficiency.
Moreover, although agencies in general are more likely to be captured by organized interests, the fact that the Federal Circuit has
exhibited symptoms consistent with tunnel vision at times suggests
that this concern is not significant enough to outweigh the PTO’s
associated benefits of expertise. Thus, this Section ultimately
concludes that both expertise and the avoidance of capture support
the Federal Circuit granting Chevron deference to the PTO.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the AIA rejects over two hundred
years of court dominance in patent policy by granting the PTO, for
the first time, the power to interpret the core patentability standards with the force of law. While an application of administrative
law principles to the AIA has substantial implications for the roles
of patent institutions, it also, as the Article argues, produces a
normatively desirable result. Making the PTO the primary interpreter of the core patentability standards ushers the patent system
into the modern administrative era, which has long recognized the
deficiencies associated with judge-driven policy. This Article, however, leaves for future research whether enabling the PTO to speak

nonobviousness and adopting a more flexible approach), rev’g 119 Fed. App’x 282 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifescis. I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (rejecting the Federal
Circuit’s contention that the statutory use exception applies only to generic drugs and
adopting a more flexible approach), vacating 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
view that narrowing amendments made during the prosecution of a patent were a complete
bar to the doctrine of equivalents and adopting a more flexible approach), vacating 234 F.3d
558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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with the force of law only through case-by-case adjudication, rather
than by robust substantive rule-making authority, is ideal.

